Filosofia da mente

Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 33 (65):89-112 (2024)
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Abstract

O principal objectivo deste artigo é comparar uma figura da história da filosofia contemporânea que poderíamos considerar relativamente distante de nós – Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) – com um autor vivo – John Searle (1932-). Parte-se da filosofia da mente de John Searle, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à intencionalidade e à filosofia da linguagem e explora-se a possível relação com Husserl, tendo por chave o fenómeno da intencionalidade. Outros aspectos analisados são a consciência e a percepção. O artigo termina com uma comparação das teorias do conhecimento dos dois filósofos.

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