Deduction, induction and probabilistic support

Synthese 108 (1):1 - 10 (1996)
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Abstract

Elementary results concerning the connections between deductive relations and probabilistic support are given. These are used to show that Popper-Miller's result is a special case of a more general result, and that their result is not very unexpected as claimed. According to Popper-Miller, a purely inductively supports b only if they are deductively independent — but this means that a b. Hence, it is argued that viewing induction as occurring only in the absence of deductive relations, as Popper-Miller sometimes do, is untenable. Finally, it is shown that Popper-Miller's claim that deductive relations determine probabilistic support is untrue. In general, probabilistic support can vary greatly with fixed deductive relations as determined by the relevant Lindenbaum algebra.

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References found in this work

Must the logical probability of laws be zero?C. Howson - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):153-163.
When probabilistic support is inductive.Alberto Mura - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):278-289.
On the alleged impossibility of inductive probability.Ellery Eells - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):111-116.

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