Resisting Moral Conservatism with Difficulties of Reality: a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian Approach to Animal Ethics

Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated equally and unequals unequally. We then explore the relations between this insight and the notion of the difficulty of reality elaborated by Cora Diamond. Our goal is to show that a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian approach to animal ethics is not necessarily morally conservative. Indeed, it offers a profound practice-oriented approach to animal ethics that is capable of promoting change in human dealings with animals because it is compatible with radical critique.

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Author Profiles

Konstantin Deininger
University of Vienna
Herwig Grimm
University of Vienna

Citations of this work

Fish as fellow creatures—A matter of moral attention.Hannah Winther & Bjørn Myskja - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy (1):274-285.

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References found in this work

Intelligent Virtue.Julia Annas - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, going on to ethics.Cora Diamond - 2019 - London, England: Harvard University Press.

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