Abstract

Aristotle (in)famously claims that “femaleness” is “as it were a deformity”, though “natural” (GA 4.6, 775a15-6), and that women’s deliberative faculties are “without authority” (Pol. 1.13, 1260a14). How are these claims – one biological, one political – to be understood? How (if at all) do they fit together? And how can Aristotle make them while also holding – as he seems to – that females are somehow valuable? Deslauriers’ impressive new book takes on these questions. It defends two main theses. The first concerns Aristotle’s biological and political accounts of sexual difference and the questions they address. It is that while Aristotle does think females are inferior to males, in both domains, his project is nevertheless to figure out why it is better to have them around: to show why sexual difference is good. This allows Deslauriers to defend her second thesis: that there is a connection between those domains.