Author’s Response: The Experiential World

Constructivist Foundations 18 (3):411-415 (2023)
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Abstract

I explain the world of screen creatures by virtue of our familiar environment and the notion of the experiential world. My explanation is meant to strengthen the argument for the view that the constructivist world model does not need the perceptual relation. I also demonstrate that the experiential world is complete, meaning that every type of phenomenon can be explained within this realm.

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