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On the Best Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism
Philosophy of Science 89 (3):621-630 (2022)
Abstract
In a recent paper, Pettigrew reports a generalization of the celebrated accuracy-dominance theorem due to Predd et al., but Pettigrew’s proof is incorrect. I will explain the mistakes and provide a correct proof.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Accuracy and infinity: a dilemma for subjective Bayesians.Mikayla Kelley & Sven Neth - 2023 - Synthese 201 (12):1-14.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Domination Results for Proper Scoring Rules.Alexander R. Pruss - 2024 - Review of Symbolic Logic 17 (1):132-143.
Accuracy, probabilism and Bayesian update in infinite domains.Alexander R. Pruss - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-29.
Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (31):874–907.
References found in this work
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.
Probabilistic coherence and proper scoring rules.Joel Predd, Robert Seiringer, Elliott Lieb, Daniel Osherson, H. Vincent Poor & Sanjeev Kulkarni - 2009 - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55 (10):4786-4792.
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