Naïve realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar

Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1897-1910 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.

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10.1007/s11098-015-0583-1

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Erhan Demircioglu
Koc University

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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