Separability assumptions in scoring-rule-based arguments for probabilism

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Abstract

- In decision theory, an agent is deciding how to value a gamble that results in different outcomes in different states. Each outcome gets a utility value for the agent.

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University
Lara Buchak
Princeton University

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