Sublating the Free Will Problematic: Powers, Agency and Causal Determination

Abstract

I argue that a powers-based metaphysics radically reconfigures the existing free will problematic. This is different from claiming that such an approach solves the ill-conceived problems that emerge from Humean-Kantian default commitments.

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Ruth Groff
St. Louis University

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - In Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Dispositional essentialism.Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.

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