Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons

Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):97-111 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Artūrs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.
Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.
Rational Internalism.Samuel Asarnow - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):147-178.
Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26.
Normative Reasons and Theism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2018 - Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.
Converging on values.Donald C. Hubin - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):355–361.
Contrastive Reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology.J. Drake - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-22.
Sources, reasons, and requirements.Bruno Guindon - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.
Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.
Unity of Reasons.Adam Cureton - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):877-895.
Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-02-11

Downloads
1,173 (#10,810)

6 months
219 (#12,111)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nathan Robert Howard
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

Beyond Bad Beliefs.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):500-521.
What the Cluster View Can Do for You.Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2024 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies of Metaethics 19. Oxford University Press USA.
Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard.J. J. Cunningham - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references