On strong provability predicates and the associated modal logics

Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (1):249-290 (1993)
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Abstract

PA is Peano Arithmetic. Pr(x) is the usual Σ1-formula representing provability in PA. A strong provability predicate is a formula which has the same properties as Pr(·) but is not Σ1. An example: Q is ω-provable if PA + ¬ Q is ω-inconsistent (Boolos [4]). In [5] Dzhaparidze introduced a joint provability logic for iterated ω-provability and obtained its arithmetical completeness. In this paper we prove some further modal properties of Dzhaparidze's logic, e.g., the fixed point property and the Craig interpolation lemma. We also consider other examples of the strong provability predicates and their applications

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Citations of this work

Topological completeness of the provability logic GLP.Lev Beklemishev & David Gabelaia - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1201-1223.
Provability algebras and proof-theoretic ordinals, I.Lev D. Beklemishev - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 128 (1-3):103-123.
Positive provability logic for uniform reflection principles.Lev Beklemishev - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):82-105.
Kripke semantics for provability logic GLP.Lev D. Beklemishev - 2010 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (6):756-774.

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References found in this work

A course on bimodal provability logic.Albert Visser - 1995 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 73 (1):109-142.
Characters and fixed-points in provability logic.Zachary Gleit & Warren Goldfarb - 1989 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 31 (1):26-36.
Omega-consistency and the diamond.George Boolos - 1980 - Studia Logica 39 (2-3):237 - 243.

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