Abstract

In the article, we consider the objections of the capability approach to Rawls’s theory of public justification. The objection is that Rawls’s theory is considered with an exclusive focus on reason and rationality as essential properties of justice, excluding from the domain of justice people who do not possess these properties (such as people with severe cognitive impairments). We point out the shortcomings of the alternative proposal to the capability theory, which is based on the dignity of the species, because we claim that no valid normative conclusions can be derived from the concept of the species. We conclude by adopting a model of public justification according to which duties and rights are determined by reasonable people (ideal legislators). Reasonable people impartially judge the principles of justice even for those who do not participate in the process of justification but deserve the recognition of rights by universalizing these rights. Through universalization, they justified these rights for themselves and for those they represented by presenting adequate representatives in the process of justifying the principles of justice for those who do not have the capability to be reasonable and rational.