Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference

In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press (2006)
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Abstract

After some general remarks about the interrelation between philosophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance tests. These are defined as the calculation of p-values rather than as formal procedures for ‘acceptance‘ and ‘rejection‘. A number of types of null hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out governing the implications of p- values in the specific circumstances of each application, as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A number of more complicated situ- ations are discussed in which modification of the simple p-value may be essential.

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Deborah Mayo
Virginia Tech

Citations of this work

Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.
A New Proof of the Likelihood Principle.Greg Gandenberger - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):475-503.
Some surprising facts about surprising facts.D. Mayo - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:79-86.

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References found in this work

Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.

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