Desire as Belief: A Study of Desire, Motivation, and Rationality, by Alex Gregory [Book Review]

Mind:1-8 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

A traditional Humean view about motivation says that only desires motivate action. This theory meshes with the familiar ‘directions of fit’ metaphor: while beli.

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10.1093/mind/fzac047

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Michael Milona
Toronto Metropolitan University

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References found in this work

Desiring under the Proper Guise.Michael Milona & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:121-143.
The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
Intelligibility and the Guise of the Good.Paul Boswell - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):1-31.

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