Jeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and Adams’s Thesis

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs039 (2013)
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Abstract

I show that David Lewis’s principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis’s reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams’s thesis applies also to his own principal principle. 1 Introduction2 Adams’s Thesis, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and the Principal Principle3 Jeffrey Conditionalization4 The Principal Principles Not Preserved under Jeffrey Conditionalization5 Inadmissible Experiences

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Ittay Nissan-Rozen
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Consistent desires and climate change.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):241-255.

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References found in this work

Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.

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