Abstract

Donald Davidson's theory of the relationship between the mental and physical, anomalous monism, , has recently come under attack by a number of philosophers who have argued that the theory fails to allow adequate causal power to the mental. The mental, they say, has causal power only in virtue of its relationship to the physical; true causal power remains only with the physical properties of things on AM. I argue, contrary to these critics, that AM does allow adequate causal power to the mental. The mental is no less causally efficacious than the physical on Davidson's theory. I present reasons for thinking that the difficulties that Davidson's critics see for AM arise largely from their own views, not from Davidson's. Much of the support that I provide for my argument is based on a close examination of Davidson's positions, especially in regards to his views on properties, causation, and supervenience. I argue that Davidson should be viewed as a predicate nominalist, whereas many of his critics are immanent realists. I trace the ramifications of accepting predicate nominalism through its consequences for Davidson's theory of causation and his concept of supervenience. In the last three chapters the concerns of some of Davidson's critics are more specifically addressed; in particular difficulties raised by Jerry Fodor, Ernest Sosa, and Jaegwon Kim are all discussed. My concern is not to demonstrate that anomalous monism is unproblematic. It is only to show that, properly understood, it does not treat the mental as causally inert