Kripke-Armstrongov argument protiv temporalnih delova

Theoria: Beograd 65 (1):87-101 (2022)
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Abstract

Kripke-Armstrongovim argumentom tvrdi se da branilac postojanja temporalnih delova materijalnih objekata ne može da utvrdi da li usamljeni homogeni disk sačinjen od kontinuirane materije rotira oko svoje ose ili miruje. Perdurantista ne može da razlikuje dve mogućnosti pozivajući se na različite trenutne brzine trenutnih temporalnih delova diska, zbog toga što bi time prekršio tezu hjumovske supervenijencije. U ovom radu ću, sledeći Džeremija Baterfilda, pokazati kako se na KripkeArmstrongov izazov može odgovoriti zadržavajući hjumovsku supervenijenciju: pozivanjem na različite trenutne brzine netrenutnih temporalnih delova Kripke-Armstrongovog usamljenog diska.

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Nikola S. Stamenković
University of Belgrade

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