Emotions: Philosophical Issues About

WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207 (2015)
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Abstract

We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then address the question of the social dimension of emotions, explaining how the traditional nature vs. nurture contrast applies to the emotions. We finish by exploring the relations between emotions, motivation and action, concluding this overview with a more specific focus on how these relations bear on some central ethical issues.

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Author's Profile

Fabrice Teroni
University of Geneva

Citations of this work

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Scientific experiments beyond surprise and beauty.Anatolii Kozlov - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (3):1-22.

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References found in this work

What an emotion is: A sketch.Robert C. Roberts - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.

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