Kabzinski in [6] first introduced an extension of BCI-logic that is isomorphic to BCI-algebras. Kashima and Komori in [7] gave a Gentzen-style sequent calculus version of this logic as well as another sequent calculus which they proved to be equivalent. They used the second to prove decidability of the word problem for BCI-algebras. The decidability proof relies on cut elimination for the second system, this paper provides a fuller and simpler proof of this. Also supplied is a new decidability proof (...) and proof finding algorithm for their second extension of BCI-logic and so for BCI-algebras. (shrink)

This note concerns the positive and negative occurrences of propositional variables. Just like the theory of infectious truth-values provides an algebraic understanding of the position according to which identity of subject-matter between two formulas can approximated syntactically by the identity of propositional variables occurring in these formulas, we develop an algebraic understanding of the similar position which considers signed occurrence instead of mere occurrence. We apply our framework to classical logic, yielding this first semantic characterisation of the logic called SCL (...) by Hornischer. Moreover, we settle two conjectures by Humberstone which use signed occurrences to study the equational logic of the power algebra of the two-valued Boolean algebra. (shrink)

Dunn has recently argued that the logic R-Mingle (or RM) is a good, and good enough, choice for many purposes in relevant and paraconsistent logic. This includes an argument that the validity of Safety principle, according to which one may infer an arbitrary instance of the law of excluded middle from an arbitrary contradiction, in RM is not a problem because it doesn’t allow one to infer anything new from a contradiction. In this paper, I argue that while Dunn’s claim (...) holds for the logic, there is a good reason to think that it’s not the case for (prime) theories closed under the logic, and that this should give relevantists, and some paraconsistentists, pause when considering whether RM is adequate for their purposes. (shrink)

Recently, some proponents and practitioners of inconsistent mathe- matics have argued that the subject requires a conditional with ir- relevant features, i.e. where antecedent and consequent in a valid conditional do not behave as expected in relevance logics —by shar- ing propositional variables, for example. Here we argue that more fine-grained notions of content and content-sharing are needed to ex- amine the language of (inconsistent) arithmetic and set theory, and that the conditionals needed in inconsistent mathematics are not as irrelevant (...) as it is suggested in the current literature. (shrink)

In The Consistency of Arithmetic and elsewhere, Meyer claims to “repeal” Goedel’s second incompleteness theorem. In this paper, I review his argument, and then consider two ways of understanding it: from the perspective of mathematical pluralism and monism, respectively. Is relevant arithmetic just another legitimate practice among many, or is it a rival of its classical counterpart—a corrective to Goedel, setting us back on the path to the (One) True Arithmetic? To help answer, I sketch a few worked examples from (...) relevant mathematics, to see what a non-classical (re)formulation of mathematics might look like in practice. I conclude that, while it is unlikely that relevant arithmetic describes past and present mathematical practice, and so might be most acceptable as a pluralist enterprise, it may yet prescribe a more monistic future venture. (shrink)

The standard style of argument used to prove that a theory is unde- cidable relies on certain consistency assumptions, usually that some fragment or other is negation consistent. In a non-paraconsistent set- ting, this amounts to an assumption that the theory is non-trivial, but these diverge when theories are couched in paraconsistent logics. Furthermore, there are general methods for constructing inconsistent models of arithmetic from consistent models, and the theories of such inconsistent models seem likely to differ in terms of (...) complexity. In this paper, I begin to explore this terrain, working, particularly, in incon- sistent theories of arithmetic couched in three-valued paraconsistent logics which have strong (i.e. detaching) conditionals. (shrink)