The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristotle, James's doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinian and Boethian convictions. Central to James's procedure is (...) his rejection, following Henry of Ghent, of the principle that “everything that is moved is moved by another”. James uses Simplicius' doctrine of propensities as a means of extending the rejection of that principle, which Henry had limited to the case of the will, to cognitive operations and natural change. The result is a theory of cognition and volition that sees the soul as the principal cause of its own acts, and a theory of natural change that minimizes the causal impact of external agents. (shrink)

On trouvera ici la présentation et l’édition de deux brèves questions de l’Ermite de saint Augustin, Jacques de Viterbe. Dans la première question, Jacques s’attache à montrer en quel sens il est légitime de dire que les habitus moraux sont innés. Dans la seconde question, il défend la thèse que les habitus des principes moraux appartiennent de façon plus intime à l’âme que les habitus intellectuels. Comme le Viterbien oppose sa position à celle de Thomas d’Aquin, on tente dans la (...) dernière partie de l’article de cerner les raisons philosophiques du désaccord entre les deux auteurs. (shrink)

This is the first book-length treatment of the philosophical thought of one of the major thinkers at the University of Paris in the late thirteenth century. The book examines all major areas of James’s philosophical thought, exploring his connections with other important masters of the time and highlighting his originality in the context of late medieval philosophy.

The author’s purpose is to understand the role divine ideas play as causal principles in Aquinas’s philosophy. His contention is that, although Thomas’s doctrine of ideas is perhaps not the key to an understanding of his metaphysics, it is certainly “ a key to such an understanding” .The book is divided into six chapters. The first chapter seeks to provide a general definition of divine ideas according to Aquinas. Divine ideas are exemplar causes in the likeness of which God produces (...) creatures. Ideas in the strict sense belong to God’s practical or actually practical knowledge. The causality exercised by exemplars is that of formal causality, but because they are productive of things, they entail efficient and final causality, as well. In chapter 2, Doolan examines Thomas’s arguments in favor of the existence of divine ideas. Chapter 3 deals with the question of the multiplicity of divine ideas. Doolan first establishes, against Gilson and others, that Aquinas did indeed hold that there was a multiplicity of divine ideas. He then shows how Aquinas was able to reconcile the diversity of ideas with God’s simplicity. The gist of the solution involves viewing ideas as nonbeings relative to God, who is, of course, ipsum esse. Now the only way non-beings can enter into God is in. (shrink)

This paper examines Claude Tresmontant's attempt to provide a philosophical argument in favour of God's existence using the results of modern science. Like many contemporary theists, Tresmontant believes that discoveries in the field of astrophysics, rightly interpreted, lead to the postulation of a deity. This paper challenges the philosophical presuppositions of Tresmontant's argument and the thesis that current cosmological theories can be used to construct a valid proof of the existence of God.

This paper examines Claude Tresmontant's attempt to provide a philosophical argument in favour of God's existence using the results of modern science. Like many contemporary theists, Tresmontant believes that discoveries in the field of astrophysics, rightly interpreted, lead to the postulation of a deity. This paper challenges the philosophical presuppositions of Tresmontant's argument and the thesis that current cosmological theories can be used to construct a valid proof of the existence of God.

Vers la fin des années cinquante, un jeune érudit jésuite publia un article intitulé «Are Apeiria and Aoristia Synonyms?» qui allait être le premier d'une longue série de travaux portant sur une problématique à laquelle il s'attaquait en véritable pionnier: la doctrine de l'infinité divine dans l'Antiquité et au Moyen Âge. Certes, les historiens s'étaient déjà intéressés quelque peu à cette question, mais ils l'avaient fait sans une conscience claire de sa complexité. Force était donc de reprendre la problématique à (...) nouveaux frais. C'est ce que fit Leo Sweeney, qui publiera, sur une carrière de plus de trentecinq ans, une quantité impressionnante d'articles étudiant les conditions de l'émergence de l'infinité divine au Moyen Âge, ainsi que la conception de l'infíni chez les grandes fígures de l'Antiquité et du christianisme médiéval. Ce sont ces articles, dont certains ont fait l'objet de profonds remaniements, et auxquels viennent s'ajouter deux travaux inédits, qu'a réunis l'éditeur Peter Lang dans un ouvrage de près de six cents pages, dont il faut bien dire qu'il constitue une manière d'événement dans le monde des études anciennes et médiévales. (shrink)

Au cours de la première moitié du XIIIe siècle commence à progresser le concept de l'infinité divine dans la théologie chrétienne, une évolution illustrée par des documents originaux.

Résumé — Alors que, pour Thomas d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome, Dieu peut ajouter à la création une série infinie d’espèces de perfection croissante sans compromettre sa transcendance et sans contrevenir aux lois de la logique, Henri de Gand et Godefroid de Fontaines développent des arguments puissants contre cette même idée, arguant notamment que la production d’une telle série impliquerait une infinité en acte d’idées en Dieu. L’article montre comment, dans son Quodlibet I, q. 2 où il expose et critique (...) systématiquement les arguments de Godefroid et d’Henri, Jacques de Viterbe renoue avec une position proche de celle de Thomas et Gilles.— While Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome believed that God could produce an infinite number of increasingly more perfect creatures without threatening his transcendence or breaching the laws of logic, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines argued against that belief, holding that such an ability on God’s part would entail the existence of an actual infinity of ideas in the divine intellect. One author who was to be influenced by Henry’s arguments was Godfrey of Fontaines whose views James of Viterbo refutes in Quodlibet I, q. 2. The article examines the detail of James’s arguments against Godfrey and in favor of the view, much like Thomas’ and Giles’, that God can add to the total amount of perfection in creation. (shrink)

This contribution consists of an edition, and an introductory study, of the questio “Utrum sit necesse ponere intellectum agentem”, dated to 1315-1320, by the Italian Averroist Maino of Milan. The study shows that while Maino defended the existence of the agent intellect in the face of the criticisms of Durand of Saint-Pourçain, he also subscribed to central features of Durand’s noetics, which he struggled to reconcile with his Aristotelian and Averroist convictions.

The following paper offers a brief discussion of Simplicius’ intriguing concept of “propensity” (epitedeiotes), an attempt to account for particularized qualities in terms congenial to a Neoplatonist. For although claiming to follow Aristotle, Simplicius ultimately explains the existence of particularized qualities in termsof a metaphysic of participation. Although his doctrine does not seem not have enjoyed much popularity in Late Antiquity, it will be adopted and expanded upon both late 13th century scholastic authors such as James of Viterbo who see (...) Simplicius’ theory as offering a philosophically rigorous equivalent to Augustinian seminal reasons. (shrink)

The short anonymous work known as the Constitution of the Athenians has long since fascinated scholars. Written sometime in the 5th century, during or just before the Peloponnesian War, it offers a scathing attack on Athenian democratic institutions. Its author is unknown but has traditionally been called the "Old Oligarch" in reference to his obvious political convictions. But the pamphlet's interest lies not so much in its critique of Athenian democracy as in the connection the author sees between these institutions (...) and Athens' imperialist policies in the Aegean. (shrink)

The short anonymous work known as the Constitution of the Athenians has long since fascinated scholars. Written sometime in the 5th century, during or just before the Peloponnesian War, it offers a scathing attack on Athenian democratic institutions. Its author is unknown but has traditionally been called the "Old Oligarch" in reference to his obvious political convictions. But the pamphlet's interest lies not so much in its critique of Athenian democracy as in the connection the author sees between these institutions (...) and Athens' imperialist policies in the Aegean. (shrink)

This paper examines Siger of Brabant’s doctrine of universals in light of Siger’s critical discussion of two highly influential philosophers on the issue of universals in the Middle Ages, Avicenna and Albert the Great. Although Siger unequivocally rejects Albert ’s views on universals – rightly so, given Albert ’s commitment to a rather robust form of realism –, he is far less hostile to Avicenna’s ideas on the subject than he is to Albert ’s. The paper examines Siger’s contrasting attitudes (...) to both authors, highlights Siger’s perspicuity as a reader and interpreter of the works of other philosophers, and shows how Siger uses the doctrines of Albert and Avicenna to sharpen his own position. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa diversos textos da obra de Tomás de Aquino relativos aostemas do conhecimento divino e das ideias divinas com o intuito de mostrar como duasinterpretações sustentadas por comentadores recentes da obra tomásica não se mantêmdiante da análise rigorosa dos textos. Uma primeira e menos radical interpretaçãosustenta haver ideias práticas distintas de cada coisa particular, enquanto que, deacordo com uma interpretação ainda mais forte, ideias em sentido estrito pertencemprimordialmente a coisas singulares. O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que, emboraTomás (...) sustente que Deus conhece todas as coisas, inclusive os particulares, a doutrinadas ideias, tal como Tomás a concebe, tem limites muito estreitos, não permitindo opleno desenvolvimento de suas convicções de cunho aristotélico concernentes àcognoscibilidade dos particulares. (shrink)

Édition d’un quodlibet anonyme du ms. 667 de l’Université de Prague, portant sur l’immortalité de l’âme, le moment de la création, l’infinité de la substance divine et le péché originel, qui constitue un intéressant témoin des discussions dans les milieux théologiques de l’Université de Paris dans les années 1240.

The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristotle, James's doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinian and Boethian convictions. Central to James's procedure is (...) his rejection, following Henry of Ghent, of the principle that “everything that is moved is moved by another”. James uses Simplicius' doctrine of propensities as a means of extending the rejection of that principle, which Henry had limited to the case of the will, to cognitive operations and natural change. The result is a theory of cognition and volition that sees the soul as the principal cause of its own acts, and a theory of natural change that minimizes the causal impact of external agents. (shrink)

Macrocephaly is present in about 2–5% of the general population. It can be found as an isolated benign trait or as part of a syndromic condition. Brain overgrowth has been associated with neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism during the first year of life, however, evidence remains inconclusive. Furthermore, most of the studies have involved pathological or high-risk populations, but little is known about the effects of brain overgrowth on neurodevelopment in otherwise neurotypical infants. We investigated the impact of brain overgrowth (...) on basic perceptual learning processes during the first year of life. We recorded high density electroencephalograms in 116 full-term healthy infants aged between 3 and 11 months, 35 macrocephalic and 81 normocephalic classified according to the WHO head circumference norms. We used an adapted oddball paradigm, time-frequency analyses, and auditory event-related brain potentials to investigate differences between groups. We show that brain overgrowth has a significant impact on repetition effects and change detection response in the 10–20 Hz frequency band, and in N450 latency, suggesting that these correlates of sensorial learning processes are sensitive to brain overgrowth during the first year of life. (shrink)

La reception du christianisme byzantin par l'Eglise catholique presente une sorte d'anomalie. Invoquant l'autorite de Thomas d'Aquin, les theologiens occidentaux rejettent generalement l'idee d'une distinction reelle entre l'essence et les energies divines, tout comme la notion de grace increee, laquelle joue un role essentiel dans la vision de Gregoire Palamas (XIVe siecle). D'un autre cote, ces memes theologiens ont ete nombreux a redecouvrir, durant la periode recente, la pensee de Maxime le Confesseur (VIIe siecle), voyant en celui-ci un genial precurseur (...) de Thomas d'Aquin. Or que resterait-il de la doctrine de Gregoire Palamas sans le patronage de Maxime le Confesseur? Comment meconnaitre l'un et reconnaitre l'autre au nom du meme Thomas d'Aquin? Ce qui vient ici au jour a travers l'etude des contextes et des enjeux doctrinaux, c'est la coexistence, jusqu'alors insoupconnee, de deux representations distinctes du rapport entre le cree et l'incree. L'Occident latin et l'Orient byzantin n'en finissent pas de comprendre differemment cette foi qui leur est pourtant indiscutablement commune. (shrink)

À la suite des États-Unis, où le don a été façonné par les milliardaires comme produit financier de rêve et acte de satisfaction morale, les classes moyennes françaises donnent de plus en plus à des associations d’intérêt général. Le financement privé par le mécénat populaire connaît un véritable succès de marketing, que l’on peut qualifier de « marketing social ». Mais, parallèlement au développement du mouvement associatif, on assiste, depuis les années 90, à l’émergence de nouveaux samaritains, véritables despotes éclairés (...) : les fondations. À côté des donateurs charitables de la société civile, le donateur philanthropique se positionne entre l’action de l’État-providence et les organismes paritaires chargés de porter l’intérêt général. Leur puissance leur permet de redéfinir cet intérêt général à leur profit. Le boum de la philanthropie est donc lié à une certaine incapacité de l’État-providence, grand redistributeur central, à étendre sa couverture à tous les citoyens, et surtout, aux causes lointaines. Un avenir radieux est donc promis à la philanthropie. (shrink)

It is widely believed, among philosophers of literature, that imagining contradictions is as easy as telling or reading a story with contradictory content. Italo Calvino’s The Nonexistent Knight, for instance, concerns a knight who performs many brave deeds, but who does not exist. Anything at all, they argue, can be true in a story, including contradictions and other impossibilia. While most will readily concede that we cannot objectually imagine contradictions, they nevertheless insist that we can propositionally imagine them, and regularly (...) do, simply by entertaining a text which prompts us to do so. I argue that this narrative does not bear scrutiny for two main reasons. First, because propositional imagining is beside the point, where truth in fiction is concerned; evaluating truth in fiction engages the cognitive architecture in ways that prohibit the mobilization of merely propositional imagination to that end. And second, because it is not obvious, given the strategies usually suggested, that we ever propositionally imagine contradictions in the first place—in fact, it seems we go out of our way to avoid directly imagining them. (shrink)

The epistemology of models has to face a conundrum: models are often described as highly idealised, and yet they are considered to be vehicles for scientific explanations. Truth-oriented—veritist—conceptions of explanation seem thereby undermined by this contradiction. In this article, I will show how this apparent paradox can be avoided by appealing to the notion of fiction. If fictionalism is often thought to lead to various flavours of instrumentalism, thereby weakening the veritist hopes, the fiction view of models offers a framework (...) much richer than it seems at first sight. To do so, I will call upon the concepts of modality, counterfactual structure and credible worlds. In the end, veritism of explanation and fiction can indeed go hand in hand, but the scope of explanations we can hope to draw from models must be more precisely delineated. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that fiction is necessarily incomplete, but some recent work postulates the existence of universal fictions—stories according to which everything is true. Building such a story is supposedly straightforward: authors can either assert that everything is true in their story, define a complement function that does the assertoric work for them, or, most compellingly, write a story combining a contradiction with the principle of explosion. The case for universal fictions thus turns on the intuitive priority we assign (...) to the law of non-contradiction. My goal in this paper is to show that our critical and reflective literary practices set constraints on story-telling which preclude universal fictions. I will raise four stumbling blocks for universal fictionalists: the gap between saying and making true, our actual interpretive reactions to story-level contradictions, the criteria we accept for what counts as a story in our literary practices, and the undesirability of the universal fictionalist’s closure principles. (shrink)

The premise that every work belongs to an art-kind has recently inspired a kind-centred approach to theories of art. Kind-centred analyses posit that we should abandon the project of giving a general theory of art and focus instead on giving theories of the arts. The main difficulty, however, is to explain what makes a given kind an art-kind in the first place. Kind-centred theorists have passed this buck on to appreciative practices, but this move proves unsatisfactory. I argue that the (...) root of this dissatisfaction stems not from the act of kicking the can down the road, but from not kicking it far enough. The missing ingredient, I argue, is a notion of convention which does the work of marking the difference between art and non-art for a given physical medium. (shrink)

The paper presents a research programme for the neuroscience of consciousness called 'neurophenomenology' and illustrates it with a recent pilot study . At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the neurophysiology of consciousness . At a methodological level, the neurophenomenological strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale neurodynamics of consciousness . The paper focuses on neurophenomenology in relation to (...) three challenging methodological issues about incorporating first-person data into cognitive neuroscience: first-person reports can be biased or inaccurate; the process of generating first-person reports about an experience can modify that experience; and there is an 'explanatory gap' in our understanding of how to relate first-person, phenomenological data to third-person, biobehavioural data. (shrink)

Schopenhauer’s invective is legendary among philosophers, and is unmatched in the historical canon. But these complaints are themselves worthy of careful consideration: they are rooted in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language, which itself reflects the structure of his metaphysics. This short chapter argues that Schopenhauer’s vitriol rewards philosophical attention; not because it expresses his critical take on Fichte, Hegel, Herbart, Schelling, and Schleiermacher, but because it neatly illustrates his philosophy of language. Schopenhauer’s epithets are not merely spiteful slurs; instead, they reflect (...) deep-seated theoretical and methodological commitments to transparency of exposition. (shrink)

An analysis of the physical implications of abstractness reveals the reality of three interconnected modes of existence: abstract, virtual and concrete, corresponding in physics to information, energy and matter. This triple-aspect monism clarifies the ontological status of subatomic quantum particles. It also provides a non-spooky solution to the weirdness of quantum physics and a new outlook for the mind-body problem. The ontological implications are profound for both physics and philosophy.

Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Imagerie Ce´re´brale (LENA), Hoˆpital de La Salpeˆtrie`re, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS).

_sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper (...) foocuses on_ _neurophenomenology in relation to three challenging methodological issues_ _about incorporating first-person data into cognitive neuroscience: (i) first-person_ _reports can be biased or inaccurate; (ii) the process of generating first-person_ _reports about an experience can modify that experience; and (iii) there is an ‘ex-_ _planatory gap’ in our understanding of how to relate first-person, phenomeno-_ _logical data to third-person, biobehavioural data._. (shrink)

Recent brain imaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have implicated insula and anterior cingulate cortices in the empathic response to another’s pain. However, virtually nothing is known about the impact of the voluntary generation of compassion on this network. To investigate these questions we assessed brain activity using fMRI while novice and expert meditation practitioners generated a loving-kindness-compassion meditation state. To probe affective reactivity, we presented emotional and neutral sounds during the meditation and comparison periods. Our main hypothesis (...) was that the concern for others cultivated during this form of meditation enhances affective processing, in particular in response to sounds of distress, and that this response to emotional sounds is modulated by the degree of meditation training. The presentation of the emotional sounds was associated with increased pupil diameter and activation of limbic regions (insula and cingulate cortices) during meditation (versus rest). During meditation, activation in insula was greater during presentation of negative sounds than positive or neutral sounds in expert than it was in novice meditators. The strength of activation in insula was also associated with self-reported intensity of the meditation for both groups. These results support the role of the limbic circuitry in emotion sharing. The comparison between meditation vs. rest states between experts and novices also showed increased activation in amygdala, right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) in response to all sounds, suggesting, greater detection of the emotional sounds, and enhanced mentation in response to emotional human vocalizations for experts than novices during meditation. Together these data indicate that the mental expertise to cultivate positive emotion alters the activation of circuitries previously linked to empathy and theory of mind in response to emotional stimuli.. (shrink)