I provide a brief history of pragmatics as it relates to explanation, highlighting the great neglect of pragmatics and pragmatic considerations in regard to explanation during the mid-twentieth century. In order to understand pragmatic considerations regarding explanation, I utilize the work of Bas C. van Fraassen, Peter Achinstein, and Jan Faye. These thinkers provide crucial tools for understanding pragmatics, especially with regard to concepts such as context and exigence. The work of these thinkers provides the platform from which I compose (...) a definition of pragmatic considerations. (shrink)

John Dewey provided a robust and thorough conception of scientific explanation within his philosophical writing. I provide an exegesis of Dewey's concept of scientific explanation and argue that this concept is important to contemporary philosophy of science for at least two reasons. First, Dewey's conception of scientific explanation avoids the reification of science as an entity separated from practical experience. Second, Dewey supplants the realist-antirealist debate within the philosophical literature concerning explanation, thus moving us beyond the current stalemate within philosophy (...) of science. (shrink)

Scientific explanation is both instrumental and consummatory. When we experience scientific explanation in its consummation, we experience what I have deemed a creative moment of scientific apprehension, which is an important aspect of creativity that comes at the end of inquiry and contributes to the development of future inquiry. Because scientific explanation is commonly cleaved from aesthetic experience, this moment of creativity has been neglected in both analyses of scientific practice and analyses of aesthetic experience. By synthesizing John Dewey’s conceptions (...) of scientific explanation and aesthetic experience with Charles S. Peirce’s categories, this moment of scientific inquiry is revealed and understood as a fundamental part of our creative reasoning process. In order to argue that scientific explanation is both instrumental and consummatory, Dewey’s instrumental conception of scientific explanation is provided, which includes why science is so often considered as separated from aesthetic experience. A general overview of Dewey’s conception of aesthetic experience and the common division conceived between scientific experience and that of aesthetics is also provided. Reasons are then supplied to reconsider scientific experience as having an aesthetic dimension, especially with regard to scientific explanations and the creative moment of scientific apprehension, which is followed by a brief discussion concerning how recognition of this moment reveals an important aspect of creative reasoning that is to be understood as a part of our experience through what Peirce referred to as firstness and secondness. Analyzing the aesthetic experience of scientific explanations against the backdrop of Dewey’s conceptions of aesthetics and science, combined with Peirce’s categories, accounts for that creative moment of scientific apprehension in which a scientific explanation takes on the quality of kalos, or sense of general harmony, that inspires reverie and future inquiry. (shrink)

Microaggressions cause epistemic injustice and prevent human flourishing. As a step toward the recognition of microaggressions as sources of epistemic injustice and their remedy as a source for flourishing, I propose active engagement with narratives that present cases of microaggressions as they are contextualized in experience. The poet, essayist, and mythobiographer, Audre Lorde, provides contextualized narratives that express experiences of microaggressions from multiply intersectional and humanistic perspectives. Lorde’s work is an ideal source for actively engaging with experiences of microaggressions and (...) epistemic injustice from a practical, humanist perspective. I argue that Lorde provides useful tools that assist in acknowledging, addressing, and remedying epistemic injustice. Her work suggests uses of anger through reconstruction and receptivity to difference that facilitate human flourishing. (shrink)

The secular conception of ubuntu, as proffered by Thaddeus Metz, supplies a foundation for a humanist argument that justifies obligation to one’s community, even apart from a South African context, when combined with Kwasi Wiredu’s conception of personhood. Such an account provides an argument for accepting the concept of ubuntu as humanistic and not necessarily based in communalism or dependent upon supernaturalism. By re-evaluating some core concepts of community as they are presented in Plato’s Republic, I argue that this account (...) of ubuntu fits as the basis from which to understand obligation to community from a secular humanist perspective. (shrink)

“Scientific research faces up with an open and unknown world”Within the work of C. S. Peirce, the most fundamental and contentious form of inference is that of abduction. According to Peirce, abduction is the only type of inference from which new ideas are created (CP 5.171, 1903). He wrote, “every single item of scientific theory which stands established today has been due to Abduction” (CP 5.172, 1903). Similarly, “All that makes knowledge applicable comes to us viâ abduction. […] Not the (...) smallest advance can be made in knowledge beyond the stage of vacant staring, without making an abduction at every step” (HP 2:899–900, 1901). It is little wonder that so much attention has been paid to this particular type of.. (shrink)

When we assume that we have cultural competence rather than thoroughly engaging in what Dewey calls the pattern of inquiry, we fail to achieve cultural humility. By analyzing how habits undermine inquiry and underlie failure in situations that call for cultural humility, we may be better equipped to address unintentional offenses. In this essay, I define cultural humility and contrast it with cultural competence, explaining why aiming for cultural competence alone is problematic. Next, I consider the attributes necessary for cultural (...) humility and the attitudes that Dewey considers beneficial for inquiry. This is followed by an outline of Dewey’s pattern of inquiry and explanation of how unquestioned habits of thought short-circuit our ability to become culturally humble. I suggest that we forgo attempting to achieve cultural competence and instead use Dewey’s pattern of inquiry with the attitudes he recommends as tools to work toward cultural humility. (shrink)

This essay presents somaesthetics of discomfort as an extension of the field of somaesthetics as developed by Shusterman. Using the work of Peirce and Dewey as a foundation upon which Shusterman and Johnson have considered the body as the basis of aesthetics, I propose that somaesthetics of discomfort provides a means of enhancing bodily awareness and reflection useful for domains of inquiry, such as healthcare and design. Taking Peirce’s notion of the irritation of doubt in a literal sense, I explore (...) bodily discomfort as the inception of inquiry. I consider work done by phenomenologists concerning experiences of comfort and discomfort, which includes definitions of each. My argument follows the perspective put forth by Peirce, Dewey, and contemporary pragmatists that experience is qualitative and that feeling is at the root of reflection. I explain how discomfort may be considered a type of aesthetic experience and provide examples of bodily discomfort as somaesthetic. In closing, I consider somaesthetic focus on discomfort as fostering moral imagination and empathy. (shrink)

In his essay, “Affording our Culture: “Smart” Technology and the Prospects for Creative Democracy,” Tibor Solymosi addresses my challenge for neuropragmatism to counter what I have elsewhere called dopamine democracy. Although I believe that Solymosi has begun to provide an explanation for how neuropragmatism may counter dopamine democracy, especially with his conceptions Œ and cultural affordances, I respond with a helpful addition to his approach by returning to the theory of inquiry as put forth by John Dewey. In particular, I (...) focus on the phases of inquiry as colored by Dewey’s concept of humility. Solymosi does not pay adequate attention to the function of inquiry necessary for combatting dopamine democracy. His account of cultural affordances and education is strengthened by using Dewey’s concept of humility as a guiding disposition for neuropragmatic inquiry. Recognizing humility as an instrument of neuropragmatic inquiry provides us with a tool to better address the pitfalls of dopamine democracy, especially misinformation and incentive salience. My argument proceeds by first articulating dopamine democracy as a problem and Solymosi’s concept of cultural affordances and how he understands these as neuropragmatic tools to address the problem through education. I present humility as an instrumental concept derived from Dewey’s work on inquiry. I then suggest how humility may serve neuropragmatic inquiry to assist in combatting the problems of dopamine democracy. (shrink)

I propose the next steps in the neuropragmatic approach to philosophy that has been advocated by Solymosi and Shook (2013). My focus is the initial process of inquiry implicit in addressing philosophical questions of cognition and mind by utilizing the tools of neuroscientific research. I combine John Dewey’s pattern of inquiry with Charles Peirce’s three forms of inference in order to outline a methodological schema for neuropragmatic inquiry. My goal is to establish ignorance and guessing as well-defined pillars of methodology (...) upon which to build a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry. First, I outline Dewey’s pattern of inquiry, highlighting the initial problematic phase in which recognized ignorance provides the basis upon which to frame a philosophical problem and initiate the trajectory by which philosophical questions may be addressed with the assistance of neuroscientific evidence. Second, I provide an outline of Peirce’s three forms of inference, focusing upon the first phase of abduction: guessing. Third, I explain the transition between ignorance and guessing, urging the benefit of attending to these two aspects of inquiry. Finally, I provide an initial sketch indicating the next steps concerning a pragmatic reconstruction of neurophilosophy, pointing towards the need for a more thorough examination of scientific methodology within and following analyses of philosophical problems and neuroscientific evidence. (shrink)

The argument that justice entails a form of what is deserved continues to inform attitudes about punishment. The belief in ‘just deserts’ is especially relevant in cases of punishment that are not court-ordered or officially prescribed, but nonetheless are considered deserved. Perhaps the most egregious example concerns incarcerated persons who are sexually assaulted. The belief in violence as justly deserved is ethically problematic, negatively affecting the health of incarcerated persons, as well as those outside of prisons. I argue that in (...) the context of prison sexual violence, acceptance and proffering of the just deserts position is founded upon and promulgates toxic masculinity, which undermines the personhood of prisoners and reinforces a culture of homophobia and sexism both within and beyond prison walls. I outline an alternative based on an Ubuntu ethic that rejects prison sexual violence as a form of just deserts and fosters an approach to justice that seeks reconciliation. (shrink)

This article addresses the need for adaptive ethical analysis within machine learning that accounts for emerging problems concerning social bias and generative adversarial networks. I use John Dewey’s criticisms of the reflex arc concept in psychology as a basis for understanding how these problems stem from human-gan interaction. By combining Dewey’s criticisms with Donna Haraway’s idea of cyborgs, Luciano Floridi’s concept of distributed morality, and Shaowen Bardzell’s recommendations for a feminist approach to human-computer interaction, I suggest a dynamic perspective from (...) which to begin analyzing and solving issues of injustice evident in this particular domain of machine learning. (shrink)

Of the scientific concepts that the American philosopher, Charles S. Peirce, analyzed in his work, two of the less commonly investigated have been those of guessing and of scientific economy. Peirce argued that guessing was the initial moment of hypothesis-formation. He also argued that economic factors play a significant role in the development and acceptance of hypotheses; however, the relationship between these two concepts has been neglected in most philosophical and scientific literature. In the following, I provide an analysis of (...) how guessing and economic considerations contribute to hypothesis-formation. This analysis focuses primarily upon medical science; specifically, the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS. By using the first case studies in medical research that led to the ‘discovery’ of HIV/AIDS, I will argue that guessing is a tool utilized by researchers that is determined, at least in part, by implicit bias and economic considerations, which ultimately effect the trajectory of hypothesis-formation and the ensuing scientific research founded upon those hypotheses. In this particular case, both the biases of researchers and their effect upon economic considerations in the initial moments of guessing led to problematic hypotheses concerning the disease, populations susceptible to the disease, and how it was transmitted within that population. By recognizing how guessing and economy relate in this particular case and the functions of these conceptual tools as they relate to the isolation and discovery of disease, we can better understand epidemiological investigations and facilitate overcoming detrimental biases in such investigations. (shrink)

Assessment practices have come to dominate much of formalized education, especially within the United States. Currently, learning analytics (la) and educational data mining (edm) are purported by many educational companies and institutions to successfully improve learning through what are often considered as objective collection, classification, and analysis of educational data. Enthusiasm about big data in education has contributed to the naturalization of datafication within the field. Educational data is regarded as a natural resource that exists ‘out there’ to be mined (...) by edm and refined by la. Once refined, it is thought to bear the truth of educational assessment that leads to successful learning outcomes. (shrink)

There is no question that the work of John Dewey has been invaluable with regard to theories of education. What has too often been neglected, however, is Dewey's work on the philosophy of science as it pertains specifically to science education.1 Although educators might well concede that children should be encouraged to be "philosophical" within the arts or humanities, most neglect or fail to heed Dewey's insights concerning the child as philosopher-scientist within the science classroom. Dewey recognized that children were (...) too often taught "science" while not learning "the scientific way of treating the familiar material of ordinary experience" (MW 9: 228). The view of science as a nonphilosophical, highly .. (shrink)

The journey to the cemetery is always solitary even when I am with people who are closest to me. In the graveyard, the we is dispersed and the I stripped bare." In Grave Matters, Taylor's ghosts become our own.

We present a two-pronged criticism of Ramos's argument. Our main contention is that the logic of the author’s argument is flawed. As we demonstrate, the author conflates probability with necessity, in addition to conflating free will having causal efficacy with the merely illusory conscious experience of free will; such conflations undermine the claim that individual free will should be both exhibited on a social scale and necessarily cause a particular organized pattern to emerge. In addition, we will show that the (...) author makes a series of inadequately supported assertions concerning the relationship between, and degree of scholarly consensus upon, causally effective free will and mind-body interactionist dualism, which further undermine his argument. (shrink)

One of the most interesting challenges facing paleobiologists is explaining the Cambrian explosion, the dramatic appearance of most metazoan animal phyla in the Early Cambrian, and the subsequent stability of these body plans over the ensuing 530 million years. We propose that because phenotypic variation decreases through geologic time, because microRNAs (miRNAs) increase genic precision, by turning an imprecise number of mRNA transcripts into a more precise number of protein molecules, and because miRNAs are continuously being added to metazoan genomes (...) through geologic time, miRNAs might be instrumental in the canalization of development. Further, miRNAs ultimately allow for natural selection to elaborate morphological complexity, because by reducing gene expression variability, miRNAs increase heritability, allowing selection to change characters more effectively. Hence, miRNAs might play an important role in shaping metazoan macroevolution, and might be part of the solution to the Cambrian conundrum. (shrink)

Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 4, Page 560-564, July 2022.

A Contribution to the History of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry: On Projected Changes of the Institute into a Research and Development Center of the Army for Chemical Warfare also in Times of Peace 1916 and after 1933. — The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics and Electrochemistry, today named after its first director Fritz-Haber-Institut, was in the first World War a place of research on chemical warfare. Evidences in the Archive for the History of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (...) show that it was planned during the war to continue research in this area in peacetime. To realize this Fritz Haber proposed to found a special Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. As this could not be accomplished the war ministry founded 6 million marks to establish an extra department in the KWI of Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry just before the end of the war. After Germany lost the war these were used for other research areas while work on chemical warfare was carried out elsewhere.When Fritz Haber resigned 1933 because of the race-laws of the nationalsocialists the war ministry in cooperation with the ministery for culture nominated an obliging scientist as director of the institute with the aim to take up again research in the area of chemical warfare despite of the opposition of the president of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft and the ministery of the interior. After that time until the end of the second world war 1945 a good part of the work carried out in the institute was done for the war ministry. (shrink)

Bergson’s philosophy marked a turning point in Western understanding of time by differentiating quantitative time—apprehended by intelligence—from qualitative time—duration, embedded in consciousne...

Concern over the nature of AI is, for the tastes many AI scientists, probably overdone. In this they are like all other scientists. Working scientists worry about experiments, data, and theories, not foundational issues such as what their work is really about or whether their discipline is methodologically healthy. However, most scientists aren’t in a field that is approximately fifty years old. Even relatively new fields such as nonlinear dynamics or branches of biochemistry are in fact advances in older established (...) sciences and are therefore much more settled. Of course, by stretching things, AI can be said to have a history reaching back t o Charles Babbage, and possibly back beyond that to Leibnitz. However, all of that is best viewed as prelude. AI’s history is punctuated with the invention of the computer (and, if one wants t o stretch our history back to the 1930s, the development of the notion of computation by Turing, Church, and others). Hence, AI really began (or began in earnest) sometime in the late 1940s or early 1950s (some mark the conference a t Dartmouth in the summer of 1957 as the moment of our birth). And since those years we simply have not had time to settle into a routine science attacking reasonably well understood questions (for example, many of the questions some of us regard as supreme are regarded by others as inconsequential or mere excursions). (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Phenomenologist Dietrich von Hildebrand argues that many properties of the material world only exist in relation to persons, that sense perception is not merely a bodily act, but a properly spiritual, personal act, and that our highest act is not purely intellectual but involves bodily sense perception. By his own assertion, his philosophy must be understood in the context of the Catholic philosophical tradition; here, I consider his account of the material world and of sense perception in comparison to (...) two strands of the Aristotelian tradition in Catholic philosophy, represented by Thomas Aquinas and Gregory Palamas. I show how von Hildebrand’s views on the material world and sense perception can be better understood, their phenomenological bases defended, and their deficiencies corrected, by drawing on the notion of energeiai from Palamas’ thought, and of participation and obediential potency from Aquinas’ thought. (shrink)

Dietrich von Hildebrand is often seen as being at odds with the scholastics in his anthropology. I argue that he in fact uses scholastic principles when distinguishing the powers of the human soul, but he uses these principles to distinguish many more powers in our souls than the scholastics do. His expansion of the list of human powers both is supported by and safeguards his expanded metaphysics of given reality. I first consider the principles that the scholastics use in (...) reasoning about powers. I then show how von Hildebrand’s account of the human person is hylomorphic. Finally, I present von Hildebrand’s account of human powers, in light of the scholastic principles, considering his accounts first of bodily powers and then of powers in the soul. (shrink)

Dietrich von Hildebrand is often seen as being at odds with the scholastics in his anthropology. I argue that he in fact uses scholastic principles when distinguishing the powers of the human soul, but he uses these principles to distinguish many more powers in our souls than the scholastics do. His expansion of the list of human powers both is supported by and safeguards his expanded metaphysics of given reality. I first consider the principles that the scholastics use in (...) reasoning about powers. I then show how von Hildebrand’s account of the human person is hylomorphic. Finally, I present von Hildebrand’s account of human powers, in light of the scholastic principles, considering his accounts first of bodily powers and then of powers in the soul. (shrink)

Some recent philosophers of religion have argued that no divine attribute sufficiently grounds an obligation to worship God. I argue that divine beauty grounds this obligation. This claim is immune to the objections that have been raised to claims that other divine attributes ground this obligation, and can be upheld even if, for the sake of argument, those objections are granted. First, I give an account of what worship is. Second, I consider reasons for and against the claims that the (...) obligation to worship is rooted in God’s having created us, God’s being our final end and lawgiver, God’s numinousness, and God’s goodness. Finally, I show how divine beauty grounds the obligation to worship, by drawing together accounts of beauty from Thomas Aquinas, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Plato, Aristotle, and others. (shrink)

Some recent philosophers of religion have argued that no divine attribute sufficiently grounds an obligation to worship God. I argue that divine beauty grounds this obligation. This claim is immune to the objections that have been raised to claims that other divine attributes ground this obligation, and can be upheld even if, for the sake of argument, those objections are granted. First, I give an account of what worship is. Second, I consider reasons for and against the claims that the (...) obligation to worship is rooted in God’s having created us, God’s being our final end and lawgiver, God’s numinousness, and God’s goodness. Finally, I show how divine beauty grounds the obligation to worship, by drawing together accounts of beauty from Thomas Aquinas, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Plato, Aristotle, and others. (shrink)

Among the many sorts of problems encountered in decision theory, allocation problems occupy a central position. Such problems call for the assignment of a nonnegative real number to each member of a finite set of entities, in such a way that the values so assigned sum to some fixed positive real number s. Familiar cases include the problem of specifying a probability mass function on a countable set of possible states of the world, and the distribution of a certain sum (...) of money, or other resource, among various enterprises. In determining an s-allocation it is common to solicit the opinions of more than one individual, which leads immediately to the question of how to aggregate their typically differing allocations into a single “consensual” allocation. Guided by the traditions of social choice theory decision theorists have taken an axiomatic approach to determining acceptable methods of allocation aggregation. In such approaches so-called “independence” conditions have been ubiquitous. Such conditions dictate that the consensual allocation assigned to each entity should depend only on the allocations assigned by individuals to that entity, taking no account of the allocations that they assign to any other entities. While there are reasons beyond mere simplicity for subjecting allocation aggregation to independence, this radically anti-holistic stricture has frequently proved to severely limit the set of acceptable aggregation methods. As we show in what follows, the limitations are particularly acute in the case of three or more entities which must be assigned nonnegative values summing to some fixed positive number s. For if the set V⊆[0,s] of values that may be assigned to these entities satisfies some simple closure conditions and Vis finite, then independence allows only for dictatorial or imposed aggregation. This theorem builds on and extends a theorem of Bradley and Wagner and, when V={0,1}, yields as a corollary an impossibility theorem of Dietrich on judgment aggregation. (shrink)

We address Mark Tschaepe’s response to Tibor Solymosi, in which Tschaepe argues that neuropragmatism needs to be coupled with humility in order to redress “dopamine democracy,” Tschaepe’s term for our contemporary situation of smartphone addiction that undermines democracy. We reject Tschaepe’s distinction between humility and fallibility, arguing that audacious fallibility is all we need. We take the opportunity presented by Tschaepe’s constructive criticism of neuropragmatism to reassert some central themes of neuropragmatism. We close with (...) discussion of Bywater’s method of apprenticeship, as an imaginative education for creative democracy, thereby rejecting Tschaepe’s claim that neuropragmatism lacks a pedagogical method. (shrink)