Though much has been written about when paternalistic intervention is justified, and about how it is justified, much less has been written about who may do the intervening. This is a substantial lacuna in our understanding of the nature of justified paternalism. By examining the question of who it is that may most appropriately interfere with the course of our decision-making, we can learn something useful both about paternalism and about the nature of friendship.In this essay I will argue that (...) friendship and paternalistic intervention are linked. Friendship of the close, intimate variety that I will be discussing is in part constituted by the fact that one friend is morally justified in interfering with the other’s decisions. Intimate friendship involves a partial meshing of identities. This meshing of identities manifests itself in part by the liberties that one friend takes in guiding the life of the other. Paternalistic intervention between friends can thus be justified because it expresses the union of the friends, and because it preserves that union. (shrink)

Friendship alters the moral demands and ideals that we live with. In this dissertation I examine precisely how those ideals must change if they are to accommodate the realities of friendship. I begin by surveying Aristotle, Kant, and Montaigne, and showing that each of those writers had useful insights into the way in which we reconceptualize the self when we become close friends with another person. I suggest that Kant and Montaigne were both right that we tend to merge our (...) identities with our friends. I then argue that if we value this sense of unity with our friends, certain changes must be made to common normative concepts. In particular, I argue that paternalistic intervention is more justified between friends than between strangers, because such intervention presupposes that the two individuals have a kind of shared autonomy. This presupposition is only true for friends, not for strangers. ;I further argue that the concept of respect must be reshaped if it is to be useful between friends. Kant noted that respect is a concept which distances people from one another, and such distance is not always appropriate between friends. I suggest that the notion of respect can be restructured so that it does not require distance and separation. Finally, I suggest that self-respect must also be restructured if the self is shared. (shrink)