This paper seeks to disclose the underlying tension in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. It is the tension between Logos and Eros which is apparent in much of Western philosophy but surfaces perhaps most dramatically in Kant’s third Critique. Despite its manifest commitment to rationality, significant philosophical expression is unthinkable without inspiration. As Plato put it, philosophy is a “divine madness,” a madness which cannot comprehend its own origin, and yet has as its goal the establishment of a rational Logos as (...) the ground of both thinking and action. Kant’s Critique of Judgment is in part a reflection upon the “Dionysian” not only in art, but in thinking as well. (shrink)

This paper seeks to disclose the underlying tension in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. It is the tension between Logos and Eros which is apparent in much of Western philosophy but surfaces perhaps most dramatically in Kant’s third Critique. Despite its manifest commitment to rationality, significant philosophical expression is unthinkable without inspiration. As Plato put it, philosophy is a “divine madness,” a madness which cannot comprehend its own origin, and yet has as its goal the establishment of a rational Logos as (...) the ground of both thinking and action. Kant’s Critique of Judgment is in part a reflection upon the “Dionysian” not only in art, but in thinking as well. (shrink)

This paper seeks to disclose the underlying tension in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. It is the tension between Logos and Eros which is apparent in much of Western philosophy but surfaces perhaps most dramatically in Kant’s third Critique. Despite its manifest commitment to rationality, significant philosophical expression is unthinkable without inspiration. As Plato put it, philosophy is a “divine madness,” a madness which cannot comprehend its own origin, and yet has as its goal the establishment of a rational Logos as (...) the ground of both thinking and action. Kant’s Critique of Judgment is in part a reflection upon the “Dionysian” not only in art, but in thinking as well. (shrink)

Toshihiko Izutzu’s Ishiki to Honshitsu, recently translated into German under the title of Bewusstsein und Wesen, represents a Zen-inspired clarification of a deep underlying tension that characterizes the figure of Socrates: on the one hand a commitment to a fully public form of discourse and on the other hand a recognition of the elusively private dimension of language . Izutzu lets his philosophical encounter between East and West find its focal point in that tradition of Persian Sufism which culminates in (...) the thought of Mulla Sadra. It is here that Wesen takes on flesh. Remarkably enough, Plato too had his Persian encounter, as can be inferred from the “Myth of the True Earth” that comes at the end of the Phaedo and represents the last recorded words of Socrates. The ancient Persian legend of Hūrqalyā, the Celestial Earth of emerald cities that Henri Corbin recounted a generation ago, is almost certainly Plato’s source. The resurrection world it depicts is a world of Wesen that can be cognitively appropriated only through the kind of direct intuition that is the goal of Zen meditation. (shrink)

When Emmanuel Levinas writes (in the preface of Totality and Infinity) that Franz Rosenzweig’s Stern der Erlösung is “a work too often present in this book to be cited,” he effectively names his debt to F. W. J. Schelling as well, for Rosenzweig’s work was a sustained attempt to carry to completion Schelling’s great philosophical fragment, the Weltalter. Scholars of Levinas have explored Levinas’s relationship to Schelling, but I confess that, as a Schelling scholar, I knew nothing of this connection (...) until rather recently. I credit above all the energetic work of Jason Wirth for helping me see its importance — and more generally the importance of reading Schelling in the context of recent work in continental philosophy. None of this has been easy. The very thing that Schelling and Levinas have in common, their resistance to the implicit solipsism of overcoming mystery with clarity, make them poor candidates for quick appropriation and comparison. Indeed, Schelling anticipated Nietzsche by openly mocking the scholars who make it their business to “appropriate and compare.” Mockery and ridicule is, ofcourse, not Levinas’s way of going about things. Even so, he too is so relentless in his polemic against the totalizing desire to know that he forces his reader to pause and question just what a proper scholarly response to his work might be. As such, the very first result of taking up the question of Schelling and Levinas might be that we are forced to set aside the scholarly mask, testimony of one’s acquiescence to the order of the same, in order to step forth as the human beings that we are. Whether this is an act of humility or of arrogance is not at all clear. Dispensing with the pretense of knowledge takes a kind of boldness on our part — for what but knowledge might give us a claim to the attention of others? (shrink)

When Emmanuel Levinas writes that Franz Rosenzweig’s Stern der Erlösung is “a work too often present in this book to be cited,” he effectively names his debt to F. W. J. Schelling as well, for Rosenzweig’s work was a sustained attempt to carry to completion Schelling’s great philosophical fragment, the Weltalter. Scholars of Levinas have explored Levinas’s relationship to Schelling, but I confess that, as a Schelling scholar, I knew nothing of this connection until rather recently. I credit above all (...) the energetic work of Jason Wirth for helping me see its importance — and more generally the importance of reading Schelling in the context of recent work in continental philosophy. None of this has been easy. The very thing that Schelling and Levinas have in common, their resistance to the implicit solipsism of overcoming mystery with clarity, make them poor candidates for quick appropriation and comparison. Indeed, Schelling anticipated Nietzsche by openly mocking the scholars who make it their business to “appropriate and compare.” Mockery and ridicule is, ofcourse, not Levinas’s way of going about things. Even so, he too is so relentless in his polemic against the totalizing desire to know that he forces his reader to pause and question just what a proper scholarly response to his work might be. As such, the very first result of taking up the question of Schelling and Levinas might be that we are forced to set aside the scholarly mask, testimony of one’s acquiescence to the order of the same, in order to step forth as the human beings that we are. Whether this is an act of humility or of arrogance is not at all clear. Dispensing with the pretense of knowledge takes a kind of boldness on our part — for what but knowledge might give us a claim to the attention of others? (shrink)

These two volumes represent a preliminary publication of texts that will ultimately find their place in the slowly emerging historical-critical edition of Schelling that is being published by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Given the significance of the Weltalter-project as Schelling’s projected main work, the publication is clearly an important one. It supplements the three separate versions of the first book of the Weltalter, which have long been available. While these older versions will remain definitive, they do not (...) adequately reflect the sheer dimensions of what is probably the most dramatic shipwrecked project in the history of philosophy: Schelling’s intended systematic response to Hegel’s contemporaneous system of the whole. The materials gathered in these two new volumes approach the 400-plus pages previously available. Even this still pales in comparison to the 1000 or so pages that still remain in the Berlin Nachlass and the roughly 2000 pages that were destroyed during the World War II bombing of the University of Munich library. Eight thick volumes of dense philosophical prose, written and abandoned by a figure heralded by Martin Heidegger as the true genius of German philosophy, is indeed a shipwreck worth understanding more closely. These new materials will help make that possible. (shrink)