Asian Philosophy

This article discusses friendship and filial piety in Ming Neo-Confucianism, particularly the Yangming learning. I argue that the Yangming jianghui provided important social settings for elevating the value of friendship. True friendship was considered as a means for moral improvement, and to prevent the risk of moral subjectivism in the Yangming philosophy.I also revisit the question of whether Ming Neo-Confucians did challenge the order of the five cardinal relationships by elevating friendship as the most important one. Through the investigation of (...) filial piety in imperial culture and the Yangming learning, I emphasize that filial piety was not only the basis of socio-political order, but also the essence of the true self. The importance of friendship lies in its capacity to aid moral cultivation and to become a better self. It could never surpass that of filial piety. It remained a supplement to familial ethics. (shrink)

The basic concepts we use to frame metaphysical discussions – our tools of metaphysics – profoundly influence how those discussions proceed. Much recent work in anglophone metaphysics has centred on a set of hyperintensional such tools: grounding, dependence, fundamentality, and essence. This topical collection will provide new perspectives on these debates by bringing them into contact with Asian metaphysical traditions.

Pangunahing layunin ng papel na ito ang patunayan na mayroong konsepto ng sarili sa kamalayang Pilipino at gamitin ang pag-unawa rito sa pagtugon sa mga suliraning nakapalibot sa pilosopiyang Pilipino. Abala ang unang bahagi sa pagpapatibay ng pagkameron ng sarili at paglalahad ng depinisyon at mukha nito sa pamamagitan ng pagsagot sa mga sumusunod na katanungan: “Mayroon bang Sarili?” at “Ano ang Sarili?” Nakatungtong ang pagpapatibay at paglalahad na ito sa metalinggwistikal na pagsusuri ni Leonardo Mercado at pagmumuni sa meron (...) ni Roque Ferriols. Mapapansin sa paglalarawan sa sarili ang pagkamangha ni Mercado sa konsepto ng kasarinlan salungat sa kalayaan. Ang pagtuon ni Mercado sa kasarinlan ang tulay patungo sa pagsagot sa mga paratang sa pilosopiyang Pilipino. Sinasabi ni Noel Pariñas na imposible ang pagkakaroon ng pilosopiyang Pilipino habang naniniwala naman si Rolando Gripaldo na Kanluranin ito. Naging inspirasyon ng papel na ito ang “balangkas ng dekolonisasyon” ng peministang si Kelly Agra sa pagtugon sa dalawang suliraning inihayag ni Pariñas at Gripaldo. Kung kaya’t ipinakikita ng papel na ito na mahahalagang sangkap ang ating pag-unawa sa sarili at kasarinlan sa pagpapasimula ng dekolonisasyon at maging sa pagbibigay kaganapan mismo sa kasarinlan. Higit sa lahat, pinalilitaw ng buong diskursong ito ang hindi napapansing kahalagahan at implikasyon ng pagsasaliksik tungkol sa sarili; kalakip nito ang hangad na mas marami pang mga palaisip at mag-aaral ang magtangka na sumisid sa mga hindi kilalang mga sangkap ng pilosopiyang Pilipino habang nakikilahok sa proseso ng dekolonisasyon ng Pilipinong kaisipan. (shrink)

Residents are important participants and stakeholders in destination development. Identifying factors that assist in predicting resident pro-environmental behavior (PEB) may contribute to enhanced sustainability. Based on a traditional Chinese culture, this research constructed a model of resident PEB by introducing pro-environmental destination image (PEDI) and Confucianism as the independent and moderating variables, respectively. The structural equation modeling for 402 residents indicated the model had a satisfactory level of predictive power for PEB. The results showed that: (1) PEDI positively affected residents’ (...) environmental identity, pro-environmental attitudes, and PEB; (2) environmental identity and pro-environmental attitudes completely mediated the impact of PEDI on residents’ PEB; and (3) Confucian culture had a positive U-shaped moderating effect in the relationships among these four variables. Overall, these findings advance the understanding of the formation of PEB in Confucian culture and provide theoretical and practical implications for fostering residents’ PEB. (shrink)

Lun heng / Wang Chong zhuan -- Feng su tong yi / Ying Shao zhuan -- Feng shi wen jian ji / Feng Yan zhuan -- Shang shu gu shi / Li Chuo zhuan -- Guan qi xia yu / bu zhao zhuan ren -- Chun ming tui chao lu / Song Minqiu zhuan -- Song Jingwen bi ji / Song Qi zhuan -- Dong yuan lu / Gong Dingchen zhuan -- Wang shi tan lu / Wang Qinchen zhuan -- (...) Zhu shi / Wang Dechen zhuan -- Wen chang za lu : bu yi / Pang Yuanying zhuan -- Mengxi bi tan : bu bi tan / Shen Kuo zhuan. (shrink)

Xin wu xiang rong chu tan -- Guo Dingtang zhu zi yan jiu jue yi.

Rasa, the aesthetic experience, stands as the highest purpose of art according to Indian Aesthetics. In this paper we explore the concept of non-representational dance or nṛtta with the aim of integrating an answerability to rasa into the structure of Bharatanāṭyam, a present-day classical dance of India. Drawing from sage Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra and supplemented by insights from Anandavardhana's Dhvanyālōka, the study provides a śāstric (analytical and philosophical) framework for non-representational dance (nṛtta) using three overarching canons of Indian Aesthetics – Rasa, (...) Aucitya, and Dhvani. We present a significant advancement in the field of Indian dance aesthetics by offering a refined definition of non-representational dance or nṛtta by aligning it within the framework of the rasa sūtra (dictum on rasa). The definition is substantiated by a nuanced analysis and interpretation of Bharata’s delineation of nṛtta, and cross-examination with related concepts in the Nāṭyaśāstra. Furthermore, we explore non-representational dance within the frameworks of aucitya and dhvani, enhancing fundamental concepts established by this definition. (shrink)

No one is surprised anymore by the dialogue between Buddhism and Western science, which develops the foundations of cognitive and contemplative sciences. But there have been requests for reflection on the results achieved, or even for a strategy for analytical research of the Buddhist East, which brings this dialogue to the philosophical level. And this level of discussion is, in fact, the dialogue between Buddhism and Western philosophy, which requires a new discourse that should be built on their common ground. (...) And the first question that arises against this background is how to focus attention on the philosophical aspect of Buddhism, which orientalists usually call “Buddhist philosophy”. Thus, realizing the beginning of the dialogue between Buddhist and Western philosophies, we are faced with the need to take the next, but already conscious step in the direction of this discussion. In order to make this step confident, we need to know where and how to start, and what key subjects we can rely on. Therefore, in an effort to find possible warnings against gross mistakes in such discussions, we sought the help of Western experts in the field of Buddhist studies by reading their works and talking to them. One of the well-known scholars is Professor Jan Westerhoff, who kindly agreed to give me an interview and answer some questions: whether there is a Buddhist philosophy; what are the approaches and stages of its research; what are the peculiarities of using the terms of Western philosophy in these studies; what can be the criterion for the best reading of traditional Buddhist texts; what can such a discussion give to contemporary Western philosophy, etc. This interview was not intended to be a conceptual deepening of either Buddhist or Western philosophy; we only tried to identify key questions that could start a dialog between them in the right direction. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the historical and philosophical problems of the study of the text of the "Gridaya Sutra" ("Sherab Nyingpo") within the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. As a prolegomena, an overview of the field of translation was chosen - for a better understanding of both the logic of the formation of the Buddhist tradition of the Prajna-paramita sutras in India (which is revealed during translations from Sanskrit into Western languages), and the principles of their textual transmission to Tibet (...) (through the clarification of the principles of Tibetan translation from Sanskrit in the Lotsa tradition). The purpose of the study is to identify the mechanism that made it possible to make a transition in the Buddhist religious and philosophical space from the intellectual understanding of the ideas of emptiness (explained in the Magayana sutras) to their direct practice, the meaning of which is the detection of emptiness in one's own stream of consciousness (proposed by the tantric teachings of Vajrayana).. And since the "Gridaya-sutra" is the quintessence of the entire tradition of Prajna-paramita texts and contains a unique Buddhist mantra of "consolation in suffering", it, as a representative of the teachings of the sutras, was chosen for comparative analysis with the tradition of Mantrayana texts, i.e. Tantrayana. The representative of the tantric tradition was chosen to be the teaching text of the highest class of tantras - the Anuttarayogatantra called Kalachakra, which, due to its systematic development and strong semantic connections with classical Buddhist sciences, is considered the most consistent and structured tantra. As a result of research in Kalachakra, a specific complication of the meanings of the "Gridaya-sutra" was revealed, which opened the way for the individual from contemplating the emptiness of dharmas to collapsing the space-time continuum of the inner experience of conceptuality into a transcendent singularity for the sake of understanding true knowledge (jnana). In addition, the key mechanism of such a transition, which made it possible for the third turning of the Dharma wheel to become a continuation of the practice of the second turning, and not just another separate method, turned out to be the mechanism of the mantra, which is transformed from a concise morphological formula in the "Gridaya-sutra" into a phonetic formula in the Kalachakra. Therefore, the "Gridaya-sutra" takes the place of a trigger in the paramitayana, which makes it possible to organically connect the "higher" arsenal of Buddhist tantra to the process of enlightenment. (shrink)

This article analyzes the influence of Chinese Neo-Confucianism on the development of German idealism. Information obtained by Leibniz from Jesuit missionaries included key concepts in Neo-Confucian philosophy that not only confirmed Leibniz’s belief in the universality of his organic image of the cosmos but also influenced Leibniz’s later writings. Such influence is also exhibited in Kant’s work, especially in his crucial noumenon-phenomenon distinction, as well as in Hegel’s phenomenology and philosophy of history. Recognition of these influences, unacknowledged by either Kant (...) or Hegel, enhances our assessment of the import of both Neo-Confucianism and German idealism in international religio-philosophical discourse. (shrink)

This is a collection of papers by Prof. Liu Shuhsien, Chinese University of Hong Kong, on his recent research in contemporary Chinese Philosophy. The first volume Personagestudies the following five figures who exerted a great influence on contemporary Chinese philosophy: Hu Shi (westernisation), Mao Zedong (Marxism), Feng Youlan, Xiong Shili and Mou Songsan (New Confucianism).

Este libro trata sobre seres humanos que dicen haber sido pájaros y peces en vidas pasadas, meditadores que describen cómo dieron el paso de la vida a la no-muerte, pensadores convencidos de que, si entrenamos la mirada del alma y la orientamos hacia dentro, recordaremos nuestro origen divino. Relacionando el modo de vida que nos plantea el budismo antiguo y la ascesis esbozada en los Yogasūtra de Patañjali, sale a la luz la importancia de la memoria corporal del practicante. -/- (...) La autora revisa algunos aforismos «budistas» del yoga de Patañjali, y también el legado budista que reflejan algunos de los comentarios que acompañan a los aforismos. Otros temas igual de importantes son abordados con lucidez: la memoria de vidas pasadas, el trance meditativo, y la relación del practicante con su propio cuerpo, con la felicidad o con el suicidio. (shrink)

The ‘happy fish’ dialogue is one of the best-known and heatedly debated passages of the Zhuangzi. Scholars have constructed different interpretations of the dialogue. Some argue that this dialogue expresses the idea of living at ease and enjoying life as it is; some refer to the idea of anti-anthropocentrism, while others reconstruct the dialogue as certain epistemological debates. This paper examines the connotations of ‘fish’, ‘water’, and ‘river’ in early Chinese political discourses and reads the political connotations in the dialogue (...) between Zhuangzi and Huizi. This can lead to an alternative interpretation, which is that, at its core, this passage is a dialogue between these two men on politics and their political careers. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on the philosophy of time in pre-Qin Daoist thought has not yet produced a thorough examination of dao’s relationship to time. This essay resolves this omission through a systematic study of the concept heng 恒 in pre-Qin Daoist literature. While principally expressing the ‘constancy’ of dao, heng also significantly presupposes dao’s ability to change. This change is characterized in the texts as a cyclical movement of ‘return’ and identified with the universe’s circular metanarrative of generation and reintegration. The (...) essay turns to examine pre-Qin Daoist literature’s use of primal wu 無 metaphors to describe dao. It concludes that they present dao as undifferentiated infinitude, liberating dao as heng from the tense structure of past-present-future that divides life in time. These metaphors further associate the movement of dao with the flow of time, reformulating time’s relentless ever-greater advancement into an endless cycle of creative transformation. (shrink)

This paper examines a dilemma within the Confucian tradition wherein one is forced to choose between upholding moral virtue and preserving one's own life. The mainstream view valorises and exalts the act of sacrificing one's life in order to uphold moral virtue. There are many supporters of this view, spanning across different periods, including but not limited to Confucius, Mencius, the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, and so on. There is, however, an opposing voice within the Confucian tradition. Wang Gen, a (...) Neo-Confucian thinker and founder of the Taizhou School of thought, opposes the mainstream position by arguing for the primacy of life and against the glorification of these acts of sacrifice. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to trace the development of the mainstream view within the Confucian tradition. The second aim investigates how Wang Gen argues against the mainstream position whilst situating himself within the Confucian tradition. (shrink)

This paper addresses the seemingly insurmountable challenges the problem of personal identity raises for the prospect of radical human enhancement and synthetic consciousness. It argues that conceptions of personal identity rooted in psychological continuity akin to those proposed by Parfit and the Buddha may not provide the sort of grounding that many transhumanists chasing the dream of life extension think that they do if they rest upon ontologies that assume an incompatibility between identity and change. It also suggests that process (...) ontologies that take change to be primary, such as those that align with contemporary systems biology, offer a better way out of the personal identity dilemma. But the solution in this case, which regards biological organisms as processes rather than things, may constrain the possibility of biologically inspired superintelligent aliens (BISAs), which Schneider (following Bostrom 2014) posits as possibly the most common form of (extraterrestrial) superintelligence in the universe. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Consciousness and Machines:A Commentary Drawing on Japanese PhilosophyS. D. Noam Cook (bio)Viewed from within the great unity of consciousness, thinking is a wave on the surface of a great intuition.Kitarō NishidaIntroductionRecent developments in AI have made the long-standing debate about what computers can and can't do a major public concern. What we understand the properties of such machines to be, and consequently how we design [End Page 305] and (...) deploy them, will increasingly shape how we live and how we understand ourselves. Thus, there is an urgent need for better understanding of these issues.Susan Schneider, in her book Artificial You: AI and the Future of Your Mind, offers an exceptionally careful and insightful examination of key issues entailed in how we understand AI and ourselves. One of her central concerns is how we might test for machine consciousness. Given the variations in design and function among current and projected AIs, Schneider sees no likely one-size-fits-all test. So, she offers a battery of different tests that she believes together will make such testing more reliable. This seems a wise approach, and reflects the conceptual and pragmatic care Schneider takes throughout the book.Similarly, it seems to me that the question of machine consciousness should also include various understandings of consciousness itself. What consciousness is taken to be has varied widely both historically and culturally. No commonly accepted single understanding has emerged, and may never emerge. Just as having a battery of tests might help us better assess possible machine consciousness, having different understandings of consciousness might give us a better understanding of what we are testing for. The two should work in tandem, each gauging and shaping the other.Like the development of computers themselves, the predominant thinking about AI has been shaped, in part, by key presuppositions of a scientific worldview, with its origins in Western thought and culture. Among these presuppositions are materialism, reductionism, and a primary focus on objective behavior. These are reflected in the common concern with observable behavior of physical aspects of the brain in efforts to understand human consciousness, which in turn has become a familiar model for work on machine consciousness. All this is important and valuable work. But, in the spirit of Schneider's cautions, it should not be taken as one-size-fits-all. Accordingly, I offer one view of consciousness from a different perspective.In what follows, I sketch out an understanding of consciousness that draws on Japanese philosophy, particularly that of the highly influential early twentieth-century Japanese philosopher Kitarō Nishida (1870–1945). I then explore how the tests for machine consciousness that Schneider proposes might be viewed from that perspective.Consciousness: A Perspective from Japanese PhilosophyConsciousness was a central concern for Nishida, whose philosophy is deeply informed by Japanese culture and by Zen theory and practice. As one might expect from such a philosopher, Nishida's exploration of consciousness is not concerned with properties of the brain, but with what we might discern through disciplined reflection on the experience of our own consciousness. Ultimately, he views consciousness as an organic whole [End Page 306] of systemically organized interrelationships of activities and sensations within our subjective experience. This may be understood by first considering 'nothingness'.For Nishida, nothingness does not suggest an ultimate and absolute vacuity, as is often understandably assumed. In Nishida's sense, it is a singular "place" that mirrors the multifaceted world of our common experience. In understanding this, I am told by native Japanese speakers that the English word 'nothingness' has an advantage over the Japanese equivalent, 'mu', in that 'nothingness' can usefully be broken down as 'nothing-ness'. This suggests that nothingness is a state of consciousness where what we commonly experience as distinct (self, other, world, blue, ache, joy, etc.) is indistinct, a state of unified experience. This is consciousness without our finding or discriminating in it the myriad "things" of common experience, but rather a "pure experience" of a singular whole. Nishida introduces his concept of "pure experience" as follows:To experience means to know facts just as they are, to know in accordance with facts by completely relinquishing one... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Emergent Spacetime, the Megastructure Problem, and the Metaphysics of the SelfSusan Schneider (bio)The aim of this article is to introduce new thoughts on some pressing topics relating to my book, Artificial You, ranging from the fundamental nature of reality to quantum theory and emergence in large language models (LLM) like GPT-4. Since Artificial You was published, the innovations in the domain of AI chatbots like GPT-4 have been rapid-fire, (...) and at times dizzying. The thoughtful discussion in this symposium offers an important opportunity for cross-cultural engagement on these issues and more. I am grateful for the opportunity to learn from the insights of these authors and editors. [End Page 314]The order of my comments will be as follows: in the context of considering Christian Coseru's intriguing response (section 1), I begin by discussing the nature of the self, which I use as a springboard into larger, vexing issues about the nature of fundamental reality, given work on emergent spacetime (ES) (section 2). I offer a "Prototime Interpretation" of quantum mechanics in which spacetime emerges from a prototemporal arena, and use this idea to explore the nature of the self and mind.Using the assumption of ES, I devise an approach to metaphysically fundamental objects (which I call "quantum objects") based on quantum entanglement and the bundle theory of substance. I illustrate how the self or mind, insofar as it is a substance that supervenes on quantum objects, could be partly or fully determined by the properties of the quantum objects on which it supervenes. Intriguingly, this would mean that the self or mind is not located in any singular point in space at a given time. I also explain how the Prototime Interpretation of quantum mechanics is compatible with change and causation at the fundamental level.In section 3 I turn to Inês Hipólito's interesting article, discussing the import of not underestimating AI autonomy in light of the increasingly sophisticated large-language models (LLMs).1 I raise the "AI Megastructure Problem," a new problem of AI control arising in the context of the incipient AGI systems that are now populating the AI ecosystem. The problem, which arose from a collaboration with Kyle Kilian, considers the possibility of emergent properties from the interaction of the LLMs and other AI's in the AI ecosystem (Schneider and Kilian 2023). Then, turning to Noam Cook's intriguing discussion of Japanese philosophy, I consider the pressing issue of testing for machine consciousness, devising a modified version of my AI consciousness test (ACT), originally developed with astrophysicist Edwin Turner. I add an "interpretability component" to the ACT to deal with the case of LLMs (section 4).I. Patternism and the Biological Process ViewChristian Coseru's intriguing piece focuses on the chapters on personal identity in Artificial You, proposing that when it comes to the nature of the self, one should adopt "a biologically informed process-ontology perspective on personal identity," which "means recognizing that organic identity is different in kind: it is an identity of form rather than of matter."His position is akin to the patternist views that I argue against in Artificial You in the sense that it embraces the idea that form, rather than the particular matter that comprises one's brain and body, is key to one's survival over time. But there are important differences as well. For transhumanists tend to believe that the self can survive radical changes in one's substrate, transitioning from thinking with a biological brain to computing with a network of microchips, for instance. Coseru departs from this, writing: [End Page 315]As organisms, persons endure by undergoing constant change on a fundamentally cellular level, including the change in the neural pathways that realize the cognitive processes of thinking and expressing these very thoughts right now.Furthermore:[I]f persons are processes rather than things, then they cannot be cognitively enhanced by augmenting, replacing or transferring their functioning parts (e.g., brain cells).I will call this position the "Biological Process View" (BPV). I have several questions about it. First, how does this position solve one of the key problems I raised for... (shrink)

Chim bói cá thường được nhắc đến qua những đoạn hội thoại đùa, mang tính sảng khoái sau các công việc nghiên cứu nghiêm túc, tức là tốn sức làm và nghĩ. Đùa vừa làm giãn tinh thần, cũng lại có thể mang đến năng lượng suy nghĩ tiếp. Cứ căng thẳng mãi sẽ rất chóng cạn kiệt sức. Vậy nên năm ngoái, mới có bài trên báo Khoa học & Phát triển.

Ngụ ngôn về ông bói cá cho biết ông là nhân vật khá tinh nghịch, có lúc ngớ ngẩn như trẻ con, nhưng nhiều khi không thiếu những lời triết lý cũng ra gì phết! Vậy nên tác giả bình sách N. P. Tri cho rằng, chuyện của ông dành cho cả trẻ em lẫn người đã trưởng thành cũng rất có lý. Ở một góc nhìn khác, tác giả D. T. M. Phượng lại nhận thấy một dịp để người (...) đọc đồng hành, phiêu lưu cùng với ông “triết gia Xóm Chim” để có thể đánh giá xem ông ấy ngẩn ngơ thật hay không. (shrink)

What did Heidegger learn and fail to learn from Laozi and Zhuangzi? This book reconstructs Heidegger's philosophy through its engagement with Daoist and Asian philosophy and offers a Daoist transformation of Heidegger on things, nothingness, and freedom.

Ancient text on logic in Indic philosophy.