Value Theory

This thematic issue of Angelaki covers the ethics in deconstruction in Jacques Derrida in the broadest way, so as to be an engagement with Derrida’s philosophy as a whole rather than the isolation...

While fidelity is a crucial aspect of Jacques Derrida’s thinking as it pertains to issues of faith, ethics, and responsibility, this key position in deconstructionist discourse has hardly yet been brought to light. Less still have the biopolitical resonances of Derrida’s work, with its careful attention to the terms and stakes of life particularly in his later writing, been considered as a deconstructionist practice of fidelity and infidelity in its own right. In pursuing these threads, this essay argues that thinking (...) a deconstructionist ethics through fidelity and biopolitics makes possible the crafting of a new philosophical weave for catching our responsibilities to others – to the very otherness of life itself – that Derridean hospitality opens up. Taken together in this way, a deconstructionist fidelity to life otherwise, to a biopolitics to come, makes possible an infidelity to political order as we know it that explodes the limitations of biopolitical theory. In squinting, blinking, tearing up, and listening, the borders of life are blurred in an ambivalent ethics of a transness within which life itself is made to waver and arrive anew. (shrink)

This paper gives an account of the most significant elements of Derrida’s ethical thought, drawing on the desert of the Hebrew Bible, which Derrida associates with a moral law that is ethically troubling. Partly with reference to Kierkegaard’s account of the story of Abraham and Isaac, Derrida examines how ethical law can become subordinate to the sovereignty of the power apparently at the source of ethics which may then destroy moral law. The political equivalent of this is the decision proposed (...) by Carl Schmitt, drawing on Kierkegaard. Derrida’s famous statement that “deconstruction is justice” is the recognition that justice, and ethics in general, is caught between the formality of law and the violence of the sovereign power. One outcome of this is sacrifice as substitution, where ethics becomes recompense for violation through sacrifice. Sacrifice is the offering of a substitute. The substitution becomes repeated and itself is then the source of violence contravening some sense of ethics. Derrida’s attempts to escape from these deserts include a poetics which recognises the subjective and the aesthetic in the interpretation of law. It also includes the development of a form of sacrifice which is the individual responding to violation in an individualised way which cannot be substituted. (shrink)

This special issue of Angelaki on “Derrida: Ethics in Deconstruction” appears twenty years after the sad occasion of the death of Jacques Derrida in Paris on 12 October 2004, after an extraordinary...

This paper aims to present Derrida’s reflections on Europe, which criticizes Europe’s actuality while recognizing its promise to-come. Europe in modernity has been conceptualized as sovereign heading, the only one capable of governing the world. Derrida hopes for a Europe other than a super-state, closed within its borders, and an economic alliance. He works on today’s Enlightenment, that is, on a new shape of Europe as a shoreline fit to welcome the other, following in the footsteps of Kant, who redefined (...) the right of hospitality and drafted a cosmopolitan order, but going beyond his sketch. In the global age Europe must exemplarily assume The law of hospitality as its key principle, constantly seeking to translate it into political and legal acts. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper sheds light on the relation of mutual exclusion and implication that binds Derridean ethics with the figure of God. In rupture with existing scholarship that categorizes Derridean ethics as either radically atheistic or dialectically pertaining to the Judeo-Christian moral order, I put forward the argument that Derrida’s ethical thinking is best considered outside of the dialectics of a/theism. I demonstrate that, far from plainly disproving or falling within the bounds of existing religious discourses, Derrida inaugurates a new way (...) of relating to the absolute – whether it be named God, the infinitely other, or justice – beyond nihilism and idealism, atheism and theism, or more precisely between the two, in a space Derrida refers to as the space of spectrality. I thereby hope to finally do justice to the subtlety of Derridean ethics and foster the recognition that, twenty years after Derrida’s death, his ghosts can be of use in tackling some of the greatest ethical and political challenges of the twenty-first century, including the pursuit of peaceful pluralism in the context of rampant violence carried out in the name of God. (shrink)

This paper intends above all to highlight three fundamental interconnected questions: (1) without reifying it in a theoretical-systematic philosophy, to highlight Derrida’s Deconstruction as a “philosophical idiom” – that of différance or of the ab-solute otherness – endowed, therefore, with specific “theoretical” assumptions (khôra, messianic and trace); (2) to highlight and to clarify the meaning of the “Derridian exception” concerning the issue of the animal and animality within the context of the sacrificial philosophical-cultural Westernness; (3) to highlight the relevance of (...) the issue of the animal and animality in order to re-think, in new terms, the question of the human itself – still essentially structured in the light of a metaphysical subjectivity –, underlining the invaluable contribution of Deconstruction to rethink the exceptionality of the human among the living beings and to bring the war for compassion to a successful end, thus contributing to the emergence of new Lights for the promise of the “coming” [“à-venir”] of another humanity and, consequently, of another civilization. (shrink)

In this article, we consider Derrida’s grasp on counter-institution and outline a peculiar modality of ethics that it engenders. After evoking his counter-institutional public engagements in the introduction, we begin an analysis of the word counter-institution. In the first place, the polysemy of its prefix “counter” is exposed, followed by the claim that in Derrida’s philosophy this term denotes proximity and contact, rather than opposition – thus determining the architecture of the counter-institution. Furthermore, we discuss Derrida’s critique of traditional, sovereign (...) institutions that he saw as unjust and violent, relating it to his theory of decision, and making the claim that counter-institutions are inseparable from justice. In the second part, we conceptualize what is named the counter-ethics of promise and responsibility. By juxtaposing Derrida’s unorthodox views on the notions of promise and responsibility, we seek to formulate a counter-ethical thought that animates the relations in and of the counter-institution and challenges the limits of ethics. Finally, we propose that Derrida’s idea of unfaithful fidelity could be understood as the very condition counter-ethics, and by consequence, of deconstruction. (shrink)

This essay advances the thesis that Derrida’s ethics consists in the practice of philosophical responsibility. I contend that philosophical responsibility is the historical and ethical task of establishing a critical relation to one’s tradition which deliberately avoids passively and naively taking it for granted by questioning its origin and revealing its historicity. Further, I show that Derrida learns the task of philosophical responsibility from Husserl’s own version of philosophical responsibility, which he later transforms with the help of Husserl’s own methodological (...) tools. I maintain that the difference between Husserl’s and Derrida’s respective tasks is the injunction they are responding to and, concomitantly, the sense each gives to historicity. Whereas Husserl is responding to the principle of reason so as to reawaken the historicity of universal truth and its foundation, that is, the telos of Reason, Derrida is responding for the principle of reason with the purpose of disclosing the historicity of signification – différance – whose operation reduces the telos of Reason. (shrink)

Deconstruction occupies an “eccentric” place in the varied field of biopolitics, as it radicalizes the indissoluble knot that binds life to power. On the basis of Foucauldian analysis, Derrida reflects on the “deviation” of biopolitics, which turns into bio-thanato-politics, that is to say, politics over life (bios) and death (thanatos). Life and death are not opposite, rather, they are inseparable, as one has inscribed the other within itself. Derrida’s bio-thanato-politics, as a deconstruction of the concept of life and its relationship (...) with the power, which is always the power of life and death, is not a different declination of biopolitics, but its radicalization. Beyond the biopolitical alternative between a power over life and a power of life, Derrida thinks a bio-thanato-politics, namely, a politics of the survival. Surviving well together, indeed, is the essential character of his democracy to-come. (shrink)

This paper endeavors to argue that Derrida’s deconstructionist ethics can be construed as an embodiment of immanent ethics. To achieve this goal, it commences with Friedrich Nietzsche’s articulation of immanent ethics, drawing a contrast with formalist and conformist accounts of morality, exemplified in Kant. Following that, the paper explores the ethical thoughts of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze to establish a connection between immanent ethics and the problem of life. In this context, we observe how immanent ethics redirects ethical concerns (...) from human consciousness to the domain of life, modes of existence, the unconscious desire and its exteriority. Within this framework, the paper characterizes Derrida’s ethics of deconstruction as a convergence of the immanence of deconstruction and deconstruction as a creative mode of life. As a result, Derrida’s formulation of ethical challenges within the context of aporias, impossibility, and responsibility can be understood as a call for resistance against conformity to established forms of life. This imbues deconstruction with an intrinsic ethical-political character. (shrink)

This paper delves into the deconstruction of the notion of responsibility, drawing a correlation with the process of decomposition of the concept of sovereignty as discussed by Derrida in his last research works. We explore Derrida’s consideration of absolute responsibility as no longer passing through the figure of the sovereign. Derrida’s thought takes its distance from the philosophical and hegemonic determination of the notion of responsibility, for the conceptual system of its axiomatic defines responsibility based on the sovereign individual’s freedom (...) and makes responsibility the effect of his power. Yet, this definition condemns ethics to failure, since it does not account for the other supposed in the idea of response. Derrida incorporates absolute singularity, and consequently secrecy, into the structure of responsibility, enabling thought to encounter the absolute other. The text outlines the influence of Nietzsche and Celan in Derrida’s thought and develops an approach that sees in his work the effort to create a poetic revolution in the history of philosophy and knowledge by opening thought to radical alterity. (shrink)

This article considers sociocultural identity and identification in the work of Jacques Derrida. Though Derrida’s philosophy is often presented as a source of inspiration for identity politics, Derrida’s precise position on identity is far from evident. This discussion will unpack his account of identity through a dialogue with the work of Amartya Sen, a Nobel laureate in economics and moral philosopher, known for his capabilities approach. In spite of their philosophical differences, I propose that Sen and Derrida share strikingly similar (...) views about identity. Descriptively, they both understand sociocultural identity as inherently hybrid, anti-essentialist and plural. Sen’s argument for this is based on empirical and historical examples, while Derrida’s focuses on the relationship between cultural identity and the other. Their shared understanding of identity is reflected in a similar normative argument: we should consciously select our identities, so as to protect the plural nature of identities. In the case of Sen, this is accomplished through reason. Derrida takes a broader understanding of this, based on his concept of inheritance. I propose that inheritance needs to be interpreted as involving active and critical deliberation on identity and that this is an ethical dimension of Derrida’s work. I conclude by pointing to the potential for future dialogue between Sen and Derrida, the need to reflect further on the normative aspects of inheritance and the potential for their work to inform identity politics. (shrink)

In “Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” Jacques Derrida returns to the controversy with Jonathan Searle to clarify his position but above all because he “would have wished to make legible the (philosophical, ethical, political) axiomatics hidden beneath the code of academic discussion.” I intend, in turn, to return to this text in order to find in it not only the conditions of an ethics of academic discussion but also of interpretation in a deconstructive perspective. In “Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” (...) in fact, it is possible to point out the necessity of a certain ethical treatment of the texts. In particular, how can we determine the conditions of an ethical use of quotation against the always possible manipulation of the text that quotation makes possible? I attempt to answer this question claiming that the reading protocol of deconstruction meets these conditions showing us at the same time the ethical conditions of scientific discourse in general, beyond any scientific claim of objectivity. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relationships that Derrida establishes between three analytic discussions and three autoimmunities. The analytic discussions are (1) the antinomy of hospitality, related to what happens when the subject faces demands from strangers; (2) the antinomy of the death penalty, related to the meeting between the right to life and the right to end the life of another; (3) the antinomy of animality related to laws and what lies beyond them. The autoimmunities are (1) the autoimmunity of (...) inclusion: democracy is open only to its sovereign citizens while it claims to welcome all who are excluded; (2) the autoimmunity of rights and liberties: in liberal democracy, rights and liberties are meant to challenge sovereignty’s absolutism, but any attack on sovereignty is an attack on rights and liberties; (3) the autoimmunity of globalization: for democracy to work it requires protection provided by a supersovereignty, which limits the sovereignty of states, and hence, democracy. The paper follows Derrida’s connections between the questions of hospitality, the death penalty, and animality on the one hand, and the autoimmune aspects of democratic politics on the other, to argue that his deconstruction of democracy is an ethicization of democracy activated by the concept of sovereignty, and a deconstruction of sovereignty via ethics. (shrink)

Based on a reading of the opening of The Animal That Therefore I Am, this essay exposes the genealogy and structure of the articulation of two motifs of Jacques Derrida’s thought: the promise and animality. Following a confrontation between Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s conceptions of the human, we will show that, for deconstruction, the possibility to promise, or the possibility of having an “avenir,” is characteristic of an “animal” structure of experience. The anthropological specificity is not pertinent in this context: if (...) animality names the structure of experience in general, and if humanity is reinscribed into it, then this reconfiguration is not a matter of classes, but of structure. Therefore, the promise of deconstruction is an implication of the structure of experience of finite living beings: experience is open, historic, insofar as it is animal. Finally, we will show why the affirmation of this articulation coincides with that of deconstruction’s “categorical imperative.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that Derrida’s writing on the impossibility of justice has the potential for fruitful dialogue with Ruth Chang’s contemporary account of practical rationality. For Derrida, making a just decision must always come with a moment of undecidability, a “leap” into the unknown with an experience of doubt and anxiety that continues to “haunt” the decision-maker. By contrast, in her work on rationality, Chang proposes that hard decisions are difficult to make because the alternatives are “on a (...) par,” such that there are no rational differences between the alternatives that would contribute to choosing one over the other. Hard decisions are made by expressing one’s own rational agency, generating will-based reasons to commit to or “drift” into one of the alternatives. Derrida writes of anxiety, doubt, and impossibility, yet Chang writes of commitment, agency, and rationality. Despite these differences, there are important comparisons and connections between the two accounts that are worth exploring. I suggest that the moment of the decision which Derrida describes as heterogeneous to knowledge can be understood as a moment of parity in which there is a lack of given reasons, as explained by Chang. Chang’s account of rational agency provides an interpretation of how decision-making is possible despite the undecidability as described by Derrida. This notion of commitment and agency as explained by Chang is not incompatible with Derrida’s insistence that the responsible decision is haunted by anxiety and doubt. Instead, I suggest that Derrida’s writing highlights uncertainty as central to understanding the nature of hard choices and how to navigate the demands of justice. (shrink)

This essay seeks to establish the sense in which Derrida’s stated indifference to questions of legitimate descent can function as an ethical or political principle, as he argues in “Marx and Sons.” We track Derrida’s response to accusations of a lack of fealty in texts such as “Marx and Sons,” “Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments,” and “Limited Inc a b c … ” alongside his problematization of a certain sense of inheritance or heritage. We argue that Derrida reveals the necessity of (...) troubling established legitimate inheritances as an ethical and political first principle. As such, we argue that Derrida’s reading of Marx is not just one faithful reading among others, but an indifference to the paradigm of fealty in inheritance. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida’s and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophies of justice share many similar features. For both, justice involves an overturning of law by extralegal means, made possible by an “undecidability” in the judgment-making process. To distinguish their conceptions of justice, we examine their implicit modes of non-classical reasoning with regard to “otherness,” building from Routley and Routley and Daniel Smith, to conclude that Derrida’s thinking on justice is at least paracomplete (or analetheic) while Deleuze’s is just paraconsistent (or dialetheic).

This paper investigates the ethics of deconstruction by considering it as a form of “resultless” thinking in the sense Hannah Arendt gave to that term: as the destabilization rather than the production of rules, norms, and criteria. In section II, I distinguish deconstruction’s specific resultlessness from Arendtian “self-destruction,” skeptical suspension, and Socratic irony, for whom resultlessness issues from the symmetrical cancelling out of equal counter-arguments. To the foremost objection to the resultlessness of thinking (the Arendtian “danger” that thinking is unable (...) to respond to the urgent demand for results), deconstruction opposes a reconceptualization of the very notions of “urgency” and “danger.” But such reconceptualization still does not amount to a justification for a deconstructive ethics: I argue in section III that deconstruction always performatively relates to a threefold danger that constitutes its “anxiety.” At the core of this anxiety is the resistance to reassurance and “good conscience.” I conclude, in section IV, by asking whether the ethics of deconstruction can perhaps be qualified – if not through its results or principles – as a “fundamental attunement” [Grundstimmung], by comparing deconstruction’s anxiety to Kierkegaard’s resistance to righteousness and good conscience, in the latter’s revaluation of wonder as the fundamental attunement of philosophy. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on Jacques Derrida’s work has turned toward his political and institutional engagements. I further this body of research by outlining a twofold problematic regarding the issue of “parliament.” Its first dimension concerns what I call a poli-technic of lying, which denotes that politically impactful techniques of lying demand we follow the lacunae of the polis, the phenomenality of an international public sphere and technologies of public circulation, and the relationship between the construction of categories of “peoples,” “nations,” “borders,” (...) and their “authorities” with practices of force or violence. In the following, I consider Derrida’s relation to the International Parliament of Writers (IPW) as a supplementary institution from which examination of this problematic might be situated in light of alternative traditions predicated on hospitality, and on sheltering the other as a practice inextricable from a “frank concept of truth.” I also consider the emergent possibilities this approach opens for responding to immediate conditions – attacks on the lives of writers around the world, accelerating global displacement, intensifying border closures, and unchecked police enforcement. I look toward the political unit Derrida identifies as crucial for these actions: the city as a space for frank and open speech – the ville franche. (shrink)

Abstract:The central inquiry of this article concerns the ethical orientation within post-structuralism, specifically questioning its potential affinity with deontology. While the “philosophers of difference” offer divergent perspectives on the doctrine of judgment, Jacques Derrida folds it within Deconstruction as a nomo-aporetic transcendental horizon. To understand this operation and its potential ethical significance, I suggest Jean-François Lyotard offers the best counter-model with which to compare against Derrida’s. Amongst their direct and indirect exchanges with each other is a dialogue concerning the law (...) and its fundamental ground. Through their respective readings of Kafka – Derrida’s reading of “Before the Law” and Lyotard’s reading of “In the Penal Colony” – both attempt to delineate how the specific nature of the ground of the law determines the way in which an individual becomes subject to the law. Despite the enigmatic nature of their discourses, their comparison reveals converging and diverging trajectories in their ethical reflections as they push toward thinking the limits of lawfulness. Through such a comparative study of their texts, this exploration aims to unveil the shared fugitive vector of their ethical contemplations within the post-structuralist framework. (shrink)

This essay starts with the possibility of situating Derrida’s aporetic ethics in the domain of normative ethics and argues that Derrida’s reflection on ethics is enrooted in the specific way he conceives the phenomenological notion of auto-affection. In the second section, I analyze, in the early work, auto-affection with signs and show its centrality in Derrida’s first encounter with Levinas’s philosophy. Derrida refuses to substitute the hetero-affective relation to the Other for auto-affection as the source of universal law and normativity. (...) He does not sacrifice universality and tackles the problem of autonomous ethical decision-making even though he welcomes through affectivity the signification of the singular other, which is irreducible to conceptual, emotive, and normative self-relation. This background helps us understand the rootedness of ethical aporias in a reflection on auto-affection. (shrink)

The article retraces three important steps along the path of Derrida’s Heidegger interpretation in The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II. Readings of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Introduction to Metaphysics, and “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics” complement and further develop Derrida’s deconstruction of Heidegger, which revolves around the term “Walten” and its role in the world-formation that makes community possible. The analysis of what Derrida calls the hyper-sovereignty of Walten reveals an ethico-political ambiguity in Heidegger’s texts. On the one (...) hand, this hyper-sovereignty registers as a super-sovereign violence that founds theological-political world-constructs through the exclusion of those deemed other. On the other hand, like différance it serves as the condition of impossibility of a common world. Following Derrida’s provocation, I develop this second sense to argue that the dissolution of the common world entails an ethical imperative to carry the other with whom one has nothing in common. (shrink)