The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Lean toward: nominalism | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: no | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Lean toward: non-skeptical realism | | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept another alternative | Nondeterminist, no opinion on the relevant counterfactuals of the form `If determinism were true, then ...' | |
God: theism or atheism? | Lean toward: atheism | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept: empiricism | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Accept: contextualism | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept: classical | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept an intermediate view | Constructivism (Rawls/Dewey/Wong) | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept: naturalism | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Lean toward: physicalism | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: cognitivism | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Accept another alternative | Dewey's view: all three are legitimate and play a role in normative decision-making, but cover different aspects of our actions | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Reject all | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept an intermediate view | Contextualism: in different conversational and practical contexts, different standards will be appropriate | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept more than one | Either egalitarian liberalism heavily influenced by communitarianism or vice-versa. | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Accept an intermediate view | Different, equally valid intuitions about personal identity lead to different, equally valid criteria of personal identity that diverge in teletransporter cases: death by some standards of PI, survival by others. | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Lean toward: B-theory | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Lean toward: switch | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept: correspondence | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Lean toward: metaphysically possible | No such thing as qualia, hence we *are* zombies, hence zombies are possible. | |