The Dialogues of Confucius (Kongzi Jia Yu 孔子家語) is an unexplored resource for the philosophy of Confucius. In this article, I make a first attempt at mining its riches. Focusing on Chapters 21 and 32, I reconstruct a multilevel theory of governing that is a cyclic process proceeding from the moral psychology of the individual to social organization, to the society as grounded in natural processes, and to the metaphysics of the natural processes themselves, thus adumbrating a metaphysics of morals (...) from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic. This movement between macrocosmic and microcosmic levels encompasses moral psychology, economics, politics, aesthetics, and metaphysics. The metaphysical forces that account for the blowing of the wind and the motivation of human behavior are forces that flow when functioning properly and that otherwise stagnate. Maintaining that flow is the task of the leadership. Once that task is accomplished, and the flywheel spins of its own momentum, the people become self-governing. This multilevel cyclic process is compared to contemporary Western economic and political theory that is based on the unimpeded individual, aggregated into majoritarian democratic rule, based on the social contract, and vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons. Contrary to current Confucian-based correctives to democracy that seek to limit the power of the people, this Confucian argument empowers the people via a frugal, caring, well-regulated leadership. (shrink)

This essay argues that Confucian ritual propriety (li 禮) and Aristotelian habit (hexis, ἔξις) play analogous roles within their respective ethical systems and that we can come to appreciate important dimensions of each category by juxtaposing it with the other. Despite numerous and deep dissimilarities, both li and hexis work to organize and publicize emotions and dispositions, ground true moral quality in phenomenally-present activity, and (leveraging insights from Marcel Mauss) contribute to shaping and actualizing an agent’s body and behavior. The (...) essay unpacks several semantic subtleties of li and hexis, and attempts to respond to alleged disanalogies. Finally, the success of a such a li-hexis analogy reveals the ways in which Aristotle’s virtues are more socially contingent and Confucian morality is less particularistic than is often allowed; which in turn, I argue, lessens some of the distance between virtue-based and role-based ethical frameworks. (shrink)

The philosophy of language in the Gongsun Longzi 公孫龍子 has been a hot topic since the 20th century, but there is still controversy about what point Gongsun Long 公孫龍 is making. This article reviews representative studies of the philosophy of language in the Gongsun Longzi in Sinophone academia since 2000. Some studies (especially in journal articles) conceive that one or two of the discourses are on the philosophy of language, while the other discourses concern ontology, epistemology, semiotics, or logic. In (...) contrast, certain scholars read the whole book as being about the philosophy of language. The divergence lies in whether the common thread is linguistic meaning or concept, and whether Gongsun Long’s doctrine is unveiled by one or several theories. These differences lead to a wide variation in their interpretation of the key terms and claims in the Gongsun Longzi. It is found that there is no theoretical framework that can perfectly interpret the book without incurring any criticism, and more efforts are needed to elucidate the philosophy of language in the Gongsun Longzi. (shrink)

“Benefit to the world” and “Heaven’s intent” are not, as is often assumed, separate criteria for action in Mozi’s 墨子 ethics; they are the same in extension but not intension. When Mozi speaks in terms of “Heaven’s intent,” it is to highlight the criterion’s retrospective orientation and its scope; taking a cue from Heaven’s reactions to past deeds, agents specify the scope of “the world” by reference to the past performance of persons regarding benefit to the world. This diverges from (...) a principle that is often attributed to Mozi, of considering the benefit of all equally without regard for past performance. (shrink)

Classical Confucian philosopher Mengzi 孟子 offers resources that can help shed light on the metaphysical status of moral qualities and answer the question of how we come to perceive them. I argue that Mengzi puts forward an account of virtue as sensitivity similar to that offered by John McDowell. Both thinkers endorse a particular kind of motivationally internalist naturalistic moral realism, and both explain virtue as analogous to perception of secondary qualities. I offer an original contribution to existing literature by (...) further arguing that Mengzi’s view includes an understanding of moral perception as including perception of uniquely human roles and the moral obligations they generate. This essay thus offers a novel textual interpretation of the _Mengzi_. Based on this interpretation, it then puts forth the argument that Mengzi’s version of virtue as sensitivity allows the Confucian thinker to avoid criticisms of McDowell’s “Sensitivity Account” of virtue. In particular, I argue that Mengzi’s account of sensitivity—as one that includes sensitivity to human roles and relationships—is better able to explain variation in perceived moral qualities both over time and across cultures. This is because Mengzi’s view recognizes that what is called for morally shifts with the agent’s social roles. Thus, a Mengzian-influenced Sensitivity Account of virtue can better account for differences in moral judgment by emphasizing that moral facts are a feature of human relationships, which likewise vary between cultures and individuals and change over time. (shrink)

Many different and contradictory claims have been made about the political dimensions (or lack thereof) of the ancient Chinese text known as the Zhuangzi 莊子. The two main positions on this topic set the parameters of the debate. One interprets the Zhuangzi to be apathetic toward political participation, focusing on individual survival instead. The other emphasizes the text’s defiant streak and locates a deliberately subversive force within it. A third position redirects the focus of the debate to an important aspect (...) of the Zhuangzi, recognizing that the text intentionally embraces ambiguity and multivocality, and investigates the political implications of this characteristic of the text. This article further explores the Zhuangzi’s engagement with notions of social and political indeterminacy, but through the lens of role performance. Attending to the text’s portrayal of various social actors’ engagement with established roles reveals a different kind of polysemic stance that lies in the intricate dynamics between societal expectations and individual actions. The article employs these examples to examine a type of role enactment that I contend muddies the line between the place of power and the place of resistance. (shrink)

Zen/Chan 禪 occupies a unique position in world intellectual history. This article argues that there is a trend in the development of Chan thought which significantly reduces the innovative nature of Huineng’s 慧能 original thought and evinces an institutional effort to realign Huineng’s school of Chan with the Buddhist establishment. Its main objective is to locate the original sources of Huineng’s Chan and restore the revolutionary ideas of his thought. Adopting an approach that integrates historical materials with psychology, neuroscience with (...) philosophy, and close reading of Huineng’s interpretation of the Diamond Sutra and his innovative ideas and methods of cultivation in the Platform Sutra in relation to Laozi’s 老子 and Zhuangzi’s 莊子 Daoist ideas, it works out insights into the originality and universal appeal of Chan and the hitherto unpenetrated secret of Chan enlightenment. It concludes that the core of Huineng’s Chan thought is his idea of wunian 無念 (no-thinking), and satori 悟り is not the Buddhist enlightenment. (shrink)

I argue that the phenomenon of hypocrisy appears in many passages and connects to multiple ideas in the Analects: exemplary persons (junzi 君子), petty persons (xiaoren 小人), the village worthies or the village pleasers (xiangyuan 鄉愿), embellishment/concealment (wen 文), rituals (li 禮), the equilibrium aimed at between what is naturally given and how it is cultivated (wen zhi bin bin 文質彬彬), the madly ardent (kuang 狂), and the cautiously restrained (juan 獧). The discussion of hypocrisy in the Analects and its (...) further development in the Mengzi 孟子 can be detected in three different forms: (1) speech-action mismatch, (2) inner-outer mismatch, and (3) the village pleasers, those who try to please everyone and seek their own survival and success irrespective of any objective moral principles. My hope is to clarify what Confucius and Mengzi did say about hypocrisy in order to “clear the ground” so that readers of Confucianism do not jump to a conclusion that reads Confucianism itself as hypocritical. (shrink)

This essay suggests a coherent reading of Mengzi 孟子 2B13 where Mengzi appears to at once resent Heaven for the current social disorder and also deny his resentment. Some scholars opt to argue that Mengzi resents Heaven either briefly in the beginning or throughout the whole passage, presupposing that Mengzi considers Heaven as an agent that can be responsible for social disorder. The present essay opposes such view, suggesting that Mengzi cannot resent Heaven in a strict sense, but only figuratively. (...) During the pre-Qin 秦 period, resentment was understood to consist of hatred toward the intentional object and belief that the agent is ultimately responsible for the undesirable event or action. Therefore, to resent Heaven requires one to hold Heaven morally accountable for certain events. However, there are good reasons to believe that Mengzi might not hold such a belief. In 2B13, what Mengzi is expressing is not his resentment against Heaven, but rather displeasure over the social disorder. At the same time, he is showing his pleasure at his virtues themselves or their potential good results. His displeasure and pleasure are compatible, since their intentional objects are not identical. (shrink)

In Western political philosophy, democracy is generally the dominant view regarding what the best form of government is, and this holds even in respect to promoting minority rights. However, I argue that there is a better theory for satisfying minority interests and rights. I amass numerous studies from the social sciences demonstrating how democracy does poorly in accounting for minority interests. I then contend that a particular hybrid view that fuses a meritocracy with democracy can do a better job than (...) democracy in accounting for minority interests and in having more equal rights and fair policies coming from the legislative and executive branches. Finally, I defend this thesis from numerous counters. (shrink)

Past interpretations of the debate between Confucian meritocrats and Confucian democrats tend to center around abstract discussions of meritocratic versus democratic values. Yet, given the difficulties involved in settling on a common definition of “democracy” or “meritocracy,” such abstract discussions often end up talking past each other. In this article, I seek to offer a more precise framing of the debate by surveying the preferred institutional arrangement of one Confucian democrat, Sungmoon Kim, and that of two Confucian meritocrats, Daniel Bell (...) and Tongdong Bai. What I find is that contrary to the claim made by Kim’s theory of pragmatic Confucian democracy, the electoral representative government he favors does not enjoy a legitimacy premium over the kind of hybrid regime envisioned by Bell or Bai under pluralistic societal circumstances. I further demonstrate that it is also difficult for Confucian democrats to justify electoral representative government through either the Confucian ideal of political relationship marked by the public’s willing endorsement of their rulers, or a notion of political equality reconstructed from Mencius’s inclusionary ideal of sagehood. (shrink)

In Zhuangzi’s 莊子 philosophy, the concept of z_heng_ 正 occupies an important place in realizing the Daoist ideal of “inner sageliness and outward kingliness,” in terms of cultivating oneself and lifting others. However, very few scholars have concentrated on this topic and examined the role it plays in achieving the sagely realm. This article, therefore, is primarily intended to investigate the connotation of _zheng_ from the perspective of “virtuosity” (_de_ 德) and to clarify why this virtuosity can “align other living (...) beings.” First, the meaning of alignment in other living beings is introduced, followed by clarification of “activity of the Heavenly” (_tian xing_ 天行), which is internally based on virtuosity and externally conforms to the “Heavenly Transitions” (_tian ni_ 天倪) as a principle of value. Furthermore, through exploring specific examples in the _Zhuangzi_, I aim to show that the virtuosity of “vacuity and stillness” (_xu jing_ 虛静) and its manifestation as “activity of the Heavenly,” in reality, have a marvelous effect in transforming the evil component. (shrink)