The moral status of potential people

Abstract

It has been known for quite a while that traditional ethical theories have very counterintuitive and paradoxical implications for questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future generations. Classical Utilitarianism, for example, seems to imply that we have a moral duty to procreate and that we should try to have as many off-springs as possible. More disturbingly, it implies Derek Parfit’s well-known Repugnant Conclusion.

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Gustaf Arrhenius
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Harming as causing harm.Elizabeth Harman - 2009 - In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. pp. 137--154.
Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming and Creating.Ben Bradley - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):37-49.
Better to exist: a reply to Benatar.S. D. Baum - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (12):875-876.

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