The Official Story of the Law

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43 (1):178-201 (2023)
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Abstract

A legal system’s ‘official story’ is its shared account of the law’s structure and sources, which members of its legal community publicly advance and defend. In some societies, however, officials pay lip service to this shared account, while privately adhering to their own unofficial story instead. If the officials enforce some novel legal code while claiming fidelity to older doctrines, then which set of rules—if either—is the law? We defend the legal relevance of the official story, on largely Hartian grounds. Hart saw legal rules as determined by social rules accepted by a particular community. We argue that this acceptance requires no genuine normative commitment; agreement or compliance with the rules might even be feigned. And this community need not be limited to an official class, but includes all who jointly accept the rules. Having rejected these artificial limits, one can take the official story at its word.

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Stephen E. Sachs
Harvard University

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References found in this work

Internal Aspect of Social Rules.Adam Perry - 2015 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35:283.
The Ineliminability of Hartian Social Rules.Stefan Sciaraffa - 2011 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (3):603-623.
The efficacy condition.Thomas Adams - 2019 - Legal Theory 25 (4):225-243.

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