On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games

Theory and Decision 60 (4):359-370 (2006)
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Abstract

Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2

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Citations of this work

On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games.Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea & Hans Peters - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):367-391.

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References found in this work

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. [REVIEW]E. N. - 1945 - Journal of Philosophy 42 (20):550-554.

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