Pragmatic Rationalism; Popper, Bartley and varieties of rationalism

Journal of Philosophical Investigations 17 (42):140-150 (2023)
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Abstract

Rational discussion guides, but does not compel individual decisions, and the best process of inquiry and decision should vary with a person’s goals and situation. Sir Karl Popper noted that after a result of observation or experiment has been obtained by independent researchers, scientists agree to reject as false theories that are contradicted by accepted facts. Popper, though, wrongly assumed this consensus also applies to acceptance for purposes of research. In reality researchers develop competing theories about which evidence is currently in conflict, and sometimes even refuting the theories in their current form. Further, Popper asserted that only negative arguments should be used in rational inquiry. In reality, productive inquiry involves also positive arguments, even in science. Positive considerations such as which basic theories are justified by the researcher’s preferred metaphysics, or what theories in applied science are justified by existing accepted basic theories, are also used productively.

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