Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together

Mind and Language 32 (2):231-256 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What are the most detailed descriptions under which subjects intend to perform bodily actions? According to Pacherie (2006), these descriptions may be found by looking into motor representations—action representations in the brain that determine the movements to be performed. Specifically, for any motor representation guiding an action, its subject has an M‐intention representing that action in as much detail. I show that some M‐intentions breach the constraints that intentions should meet. I then identify a set of intentions—motor intentions—that represent actions in as much detail as some motor representations while meeting the constraints that intentions should meet.

Similar books and articles

Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
Intentions, goals, and the archaeological record.Rex Welshon - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):425-426.
The content of intentions.Elisabeth Patherie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.
Proximal intentions, intention-reports, and vetoing.Alfred Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14.
some Remarks On Intention In Action.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Studies in Social Justice:1-18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-04-07

Downloads
638 (#27,975)

6 months
243 (#10,227)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Chiara Brozzo
Universitat de Barcelona

Citations of this work

Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):286-305.
The psychological reality of practical representation.Carlotta Pavese - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):784-821.
The skill of self-control.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6251-6273.

View all 30 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

View all 36 references / Add more references