Reconsidering perceptual constancy

Philosophical Psychology 35 (7):1057-1071 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The world shows some degree of invariance, and we perceive this invariance despite a lot of variation generated locally by our movements, changes in illumination, and the way in which our sense organs react to stimulation. Generally, philosophy and psychology each explain our perception of invariance through the notion of ‘perceptual constancy’. According to the traditional definition, perceptual constancies are capacities to perceive the objective (i.e., perceiver- and context-independent) local properties of external objects despite variation in the stimulation of sensory organs. In this paper, we argue that the traditional understanding of perceptual constancy should be expanded to include a broader range of phenomena connected to the perception of invariance. Our argument starts from an odd activity: pole balancing. Balancing a pole-shaped object (e.g., a broomstick) on the palm of your hand in order to maintain it in an upright position requires (multimodal) perception and continuous tracking (within a certain range) of a particular kind of global invariant feature in the world. By examining this activity and its connection to the notion of perceptual constancy as it is traditionally understood, we propose an alternative account with the goal of clarifying the relationship between the alleged mechanisms underlying constancy and the philosophical implications of the phenomenon.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,897

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Constancy and Constitution.Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):781-798.
Husserl on Perceptual Constancy.Michael Madary - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.
Perceptual constancy and the dimensions of perceptual experience.John O’Dea - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):421-434.
Art and Ambiguity: A Gestalt-Shift Approach to Elusive Appearances.John O'Dea - 2018 - In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.
How Things Look (And What Things Look That Way).Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 226.
Size-constancy judgments and perceptual compromise.V. R. Carlson - 1962 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (1):68.
Form constancy and the perceptual task: A developmental study.Dale W. Kaess - 1970 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 83 (3p1):465.
Merleau-Ponty on Style as the Key to Perceptual Presence and Constancy.Samantha Matherne - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (4):693-727.
Colour layering and colour constancy.Derek H. Brown - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-09

Downloads
40 (#398,369)

6 months
9 (#308,527)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Alessandra Buccella
Chapman University
Anthony Chemero
University of Cincinnati

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Attention and perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):263-270.
How Things Look (And What Things Look That Way).Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 226.
Colour constancy as counterfactual.Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.

View all 12 references / Add more references