Abstract

In this dissertation, I examine historical and contemporary versions of the ontological argument for God’s existence and objections to it, focusing on versions of the argument that contain Linkage Premises. I argue that the most plausible kind of objection to these and other ontological arguments is a version of the parody-style counterargument found in contemporary literature. If this counterargument succeeds, it results in a reductio ad absurdum of the ontological argument. I then examine the relationship between being and goodness found in certain medieval philosophers such as Aquinas, Augustine, and Boethius. I argue that this view is coherent and plausible. Then, I argue that for versions of the ontological argument that contain a Linkage Premise to succeed, both against my counterargument and on their own terms, the proponent must presuppose the Convertibility Thesis of Being and Goodness. Finally, I argue that greater attention ought to be paid to this medieval view, not only for its positive results related to the ontological argument, but also because of its relevance in other ethical, metaethical, and metaphysical matters.