Why how and why aren’t enough: more problems with Mayr’s proximate-ultimate distinction

Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):767-780 (2013)
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Abstract

Like Laland et al., I think Mayr’s distinction is problematic, but I identify a further problem with it. I argue that Mayr’s distinction is a false dichotomy, and obscures an important question about evolutionary change. I show how this question, once revealed, sheds light on some debates in evo-devo that Laland et al.’s analysis cannot, and suggest that it provides a different view about how future integration between biological disciplines might proceed

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Brett Calcott
University of Sydney

References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
The origin of species.Charles Darwin - 1859 - New York: Norton. Edited by Philip Appleman.
Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
What is a mechanism? A counterfactual account.Jim Woodward - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S366-S377.

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