Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):87-112 (2019)
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Abstract

We investigate how to assign probabilities to sentences that contain a type-free truth predicate. These probability values track how often a sentence is satisfied in transfinite revision sequences, following Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. This answers an open problem by Leitgeb which asks how one might describe transfinite stages of the revision sequence using such probability functions. We offer a general construction, and explore additional constraints that lead to desirable properties of the resulting probability function. One such property is Leitgeb’s Probabilistic Convention T, which says that the probability of φ equals the probability that φ is true.

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Author Profiles

Catrin Campbell-Moore
University of Bristol
Leon Horsten
Universität Konstanz
Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

Triangulating non-archimedean probability.Hazel Brickhill & Leon Horsten - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):519-546.
The revision theory of truth.Philip Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Paradoxes and contemporary logic.Andrea Cantini - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.
Infinitesimal Probabilities.Vieri Benci, Leon Horsten & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):509-552.
Non-Archimedean Probability.Vieri Benci, Leon Horsten & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2013 - Milan Journal of Mathematics 81 (1):121-151.

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