Scientific controversies and philosophical tradition

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 27 (3):397-424 (2023)
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Abstract

The article discusses the following question: why has the traditional philosophy of science been reluctant to seriously deal with scientific controversies? An answer is offered and an alternative is suggested. This alternative gives a leading role to the study of controversies within the framework of the philosophy of science. This proposal is supported, firstly, by a brief review of the research methodology employed by Johannes Kepler and, secondly, by the study of the emergence of quantum mechanics by Mara Beller. The defense of the study of controversies is based on the recognition of the other one as the founding point of scientific objectivity and in the proposal of a kind of triangulation.

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