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The essential tie between knowing and believing: a causal account of knowledge and epistemic reasons
Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press (2011)
Abstract
This book offers a causal-explanatory account of knowledge as true belief caused by the worldly state of affairs that explains its existence. It also defends a contextual account of epistemic reasons, arguing that both foundationalism and coherentism cannot provide a satisfactory account of such reasons. Skeptical arguments are answered against a historical background from Plato to the present day.Author's Profile
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