Contrastive Support: Some Competing Accounts

Synthese 190 (1) (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I outline four competing probabilistic accounts of contrastive evidential support and consider various considerations that might help arbitrate between these. The upshot of the discussion is that the so-called ‘Law of Likelihood’ is to be preferred to any of the alternatives considered.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/s11229-010-9845-9

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,611

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Contrastive confirmation: some competing accounts.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):129-138.
Remarks on Probability and “Intelligent Design”.Branden Fitelson - unknown
Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts.Kareem Khalifa - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (4):263-284.
Contrastive statistical explanation and causal heterogeneity.Jaakko Kuorikoski - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):435-452.
On d-trees, beans, and b-accents.Daniel Büring - 2003 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (5):511 - 545.
Do customs compete with conditioning? Turf battles and division of labor in social explanation.Todd Jones - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):407-430.
Explanations of social phenomena: Competing and complementary accounts.Todd Jones - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):621-650.
Contrastive Bayesianism.Branden Fitelson - 2013 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge Claims.Joel Buenting - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (2):99-104.
Contrastive knowledge.Antti Karjalainen & Adam Morton - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89.
Contrastive causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
The role of contrast in causal and explanatory claims.Christopher Hitchcock - 1996 - Synthese 107 (3):395 - 419.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-07-07

Downloads
106 (#167,207)

6 months
9 (#320,673)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47 (C):81-90.
Genuine confirmation and tacking by conjunction.Michael Schippers & Gerhard Schurz - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1):321-352.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references