Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account

Noûs 45 (4):595-639 (2011)
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Abstract

When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?

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10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00788.x

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David Chalmers
New York University

Citations of this work

The nature of epistemic space.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
Remarks on counterpossibles.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):639-660.
Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.

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References found in this work

Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The components of content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.

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