Abstract

The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Davis, a case that raises the question of how to allocate frozen embryos in the event of divorce, addresses many of the legal issues posed by in vitro fertilization. The decision considers the interests of the progenitors as well as of the children who may result. For example, the court held that gamete providers' discretion regarding the disposition of embryos can be limited only when their decisions would harm the children who might be born. The court also made clear that efforts to seek genetic parenthood are protected only when accompanied by a desire to raise the resulting children, a conclusion that also affects other reproductive technologies. In addition to elaborating an analytic framework, the court set guidelines for resolving disputes when the couples had made no prior agreements, including holding that while the embryos are ex-utero the desire to avoid genetic parenthood almost always trumps the wish to become a parent. The well-reasoned analysis in Davis v. Davis should help shape legal and ethical discussion regarding the use of in vitro fertilization for many years to come.