Belief, reason, and motivation: Michael Smith's "the moral problem"

Ethics 108 (1):33-54 (1997)
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10.1086/233787

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David Copp
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Citations of this work

Praiseworthy Motivations.Zoë A. Johnson King - 2019 - Noûs 54 (2):408-430.
De dicto desires and morality as fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.
Motivational internalism.Christian Basil Miller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233-255.

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