Abstract
The James‐Husserl thesis is potentially of great importance for the understanding of consciousness. While there may be a good deal of agreement on the need to posit a specious present in some form or other, there is profound disagreement over the correct way of conceiving of it. This chapter surveys some of the more important landmarks in this contentious territory. An account of what is the specious present was elaborated by Brentano in lectures in the 1860s. Brentano fully appreciated the importance to phenomenology – “descriptive psychology” – of understanding how people manage to perceive temporal succession. The Orthogonal and Extensional accounts of people's temporal experience are in two respects very similar. Both sides agree that change, succession, and persistence figure prominently and vividly in people's immediate experience, over short intervals of time; they also agree that this is possible in virtue of an abiding structural feature of people's consciousness.