Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive?

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):161-169 (2011)
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Abstract

In his "Ontological proof", Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property φ: If φ is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is positive. Given axiom 2, sentences A and B paradoxically cannot be both true or both false, and it is also impossible that one of the sentences is true whereas the other is false.

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Gregor Damschen
University of Oldenburg

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