The Compatibility of Justice and Kindness

Philosophy 65 (254):516 - 517 (1990)
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Abstract

In ‘Virtue and Character’ A. D. M. Walker claims that kindness and justice are incompatible in certain important ways and that a person can be kind or just without possessing the other virtue. Walker argues that virtues must lead to ‘effective and intelligent action’ and that a virtue ceases to exist if ‘it leads to violation of the minimal requirements of any other virtue’. On this view kindness and justice function independently to produce effective action. Kindness requires a direct caring for the individual in particular circumstances, while justice involves a commitment to impartiality that abstracts from an individual's situation. Walker argues that, as long as the minimal requirements of other virtues are met, one can be kind without weighing considerations of justice. He cites with approval kind behaviour which human beings learn as young children. Such behaviour may be a deeply engrained personality trait, and the individual passing through different situations in life may have no need to consider questions of justice. ‘He will merely need to be able to recognize and respond to certain types of considerations as overriding the values promoted by kindness’

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Virtues and Vices.James D. Wallace - 1978 - Philosophy 54 (210):568-569.
Virtue and Character.A. D. M. Walker - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (249):349-362.
Virtue and Character.A. D. M. Walker - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (249):349 - 362.

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