Affective intentionality and practical rationality

Dialectica 61 (3):311-322 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

‘Emotions are Janus-faced,’ writes de Sousa. ‘This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truth of emotions, one of which is about the self, and the other about conditions in the world’. Emotions, it is claimed, disclose facts about how the world is and about who we are. The articles in this volume all focus on one, the other, or both of these aspects of emotions – How do they contribute to provide reasons for judgements and actions? How do these judgements and actions, individual or collective, serve as occasions for interrogation and evaluation of the self or of morality?

Similar books and articles

Intentionality without Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):369 - 376.
Intentionality without rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.
The Ways of Reason.Juan Manuel Comesana - 2003 - Dissertation, Brown University
Rationality and higher-order intentionality.Alan Millar - 2001 - Philosophy Supplement 49:179-198.
Affective intentionality and the feeling body.Jan Slaby - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
Affective intentionality and self-consciousness.Jan Slaby & Achim Stephan - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):506-513.
Procedural and substantive practical rationality.Brad Hooker & Bart Steumer - 2003 - In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 57--74.
Diachronic Structural Rationality.Luca Ferrero - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):311-336.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-01-07

Downloads
317 (#64,833)

6 months
87 (#55,253)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Ivo Wallimann-Helmer
Université de Fribourg
Christine Clavien
University of Geneva
Julien Deonna
University of Geneva

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Joint intention, we-mode and I-mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
Maxims and thick ethical concepts.A. W. Moore - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):129–147.
Group wrongs and guilt feelings.Margaret Gilbert - 1997 - The Journal of Ethics 1 (1):65-84.

Add more references