Reasons and factive emotions

Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper, I present and explore some ideas about how factive emotional states and factive perceptual states each relate to knowledge and reasons. This discussion will shed light on the so-called ‘perceptual model’ of the emotions.

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Christina H. Dietz
Australian Catholic University

References found in this work

Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.
A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press.

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