Abstract

This contribution reads the current debate on African personhood and human dignity against the backdrop of South African women’s struggle for dignity in the face of persistent and pervasive interpersonal violence perpetrated against them by South African men. The point of departure is Menkiti’s classic description of normative personhood in African “traditional thought”, as translated into “the idiom of modern philosophy”. This starting point exposes two fault lines that run through all African philosophical endeavours: the first is the tension between normative and descriptive emphases, and the second fault line is the tension contained in the very task of ‘translation’—in the need for illuminating the distinctiveness of African notions, while simultaneously rendering them understandable in, and productive for, a modern (universal) philosophical idiom. For Menkiti, what is distinctive about African personhood is that the community takes both ontological and epistemological precedence over the individual. Feminist and other criticisms (Imafidon) show how this notion of personhood becomes discriminatory. In response to these criticisms, Molefe’s nuanced understanding of the internal relationship between the intrinsic and extrinsic worth of persons is linked with the work of Gobodo-Madikizela on forgiveness and the capacity for sympathy. The contribution concludes with the insight that human dignity and personhood (and Ubuntu) in African philosophy should be reconnected with the concrete struggles of the powerless to be recognised and treated as fully human—a tradition with a long and rich history in our part of the world. Only then will we have a critical and incisive enough version of personhood and Ubuntu to tackle the crisis of violence against women and children.