Abstract
On most accounts of global democracy, human rights are ascribed a
central function. Still, their conceptual role in global democracy is often unclear.
Two recent attempts to remedy this deficiency have been made by James Bohman
and Michael Goodhart. What is interesting about their proposals is that they make
the case that under the present circumstances of politics, global democracy is best
conceptualized in terms of human rights. Although the article is sympathetic to this
‘human rights approach’, it defends the thesis that human rights are not enough for
global democracy. It argues that insofar as we hold on to the general idea of
democracy as a normative ideal of self-determination (self-rule) that is, of people
determining their own lives and ruling over themselves, the concept of democracy
accommodates two necessary conditions, namely, political bindingness and political
equality. Further, it argues that neither Bohman’s nor Goodhart’s accounts
fulfills these conditions and that one explanation for this could be traced to a lack
of clarity concerning the distinction between democracy as normative ideal and
democracy as decision method or rules (for example, institutions, laws and norms)
for regulating social interactions. This ambiguity has implications for both
Goodhart and Bohman. In Goodhart’s work it manifests itself as a vagueness
concerning the difference between political agency and democratic agency; in
Bohman’s work it becomes unclear whether he contributes a normative democratic
theory or a theory of democratization. Although this article develops both a
conceptual and a normative argument against their proposals, the aim is not to find
fault with them but to point to questions that are in need of further elaboration to
make them more convincing.