Networks, intentionality and multiple realizability: Not enough to block reductionism

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (2019)
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Abstract

Borsboom, Cramer, and Kalis propose that the network approach blocks reductionism in psychopathology. We argue that the two main arguments, intentionality and multiple realizability of mental disorders, are not sufficient to establish that mental disorders are not brain disorders, and that the specific role of networks in these arguments is unclear.

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Markus Eronen
University of Groningen

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